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INTRODUCTION
The enormous volumes of waste plastics are well
known,1 and the environmental costs are clear.2 The
term ‘single-use’ is fixed in public knowledge.3 The
resultant ‘backlash’ against plastics,4 renders favourable
plastics waste reduction strategies.5 There have been
international and domestic government waste
limitation strategies alongside commercial responses.6
Such strategies have added impetus following decisions
in other countries to stop importing of waste plastics.7
On 18 December 2018 the UK Government published
its waste strategy for England,8 which notably included
specific reference to plastics waste as well as explicit
engagement with circular economics, with global and
domestic action continuing since.9 March 2019 saw
the European Commission publish A Circular
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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1 For the volumes of plastics waste see Department of
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Our Waste, Our
Resources: A Strategy for England: Evidence Annex (18
December 2018) <www.gov.uk/government/
publications/resources-and-waste-strategy-for-england>,
106-108; see also Edward Humes, Garbology: Our Dirty
Love Affair with Trash (Penguin 2012) 65, referring to the
‘plasticization of America’, and chs 5 and 6 generally on
the extent and (environmental) costs of plastic use.
2 Less well known is that plastics waste is not necessarily
the most significant source of  waste: Her Majesty’s
Revenue and Customs, Tackling the Hidden Economy: Public
Sector Licensing (8 December 2017) <www.gov.uk/
government/consu l ta t ions/tack l ing- the-h idden-
economy-public-sector-licensing> 12; see also BBC
News, ‘Anti-Plastic Focus “Dangerous Distraction” from
Climate Change’ BBC News (22 October 2018)
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-45942814>.
3 ‘Single-use’ has been declared word of the year by Collins
Dictionary: BBC News, ‘What is 2018’s Word of  the Year?’
BBC News (7 November 2018) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/
uk-46121787>.
4 Stephen Buranyi, ‘The Plastic Backlash: What’s Behind
our Sudden Rage – And Will it Make a Difference’ The
Guardian (13 November 2018) <www.theguardian.com/
environment/2018/nov/13/the-plastic-backlash-whats-
behind-our-sudden-rage-and-will-it-make-a-difference>.
5 See Jessica Elgot, ‘UK Public Backs Tough Action on
Plastic Waste in Record Numbers’ The Guardian (18
August 2018) <www.theguardian.com/environment/
2018/aug/18/uk-public-backs-tough-action-on-plastic-
waste-record-numbers-consultation-latte-levy-tax>;
Sandra Laville, ‘Plastic Waste Set to Beat Price as UK
Shoppers’ Top Concern – Study’ The Guardian (10
September 2018) <www.theguardian.com/
environment/2018/sep/10/plastic-waste-set-to-beat-
price-as-uk-shoppers-top-concern-study>.
6 See BBC News, ‘Iceland Supermarket Chain Aims to be
Plastic Free by 2023’ BBC News (16 January 2018) <
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-42692642>; BBC News,
‘McDonald’s Aims for Fully Recycled Packaging by 2025’
BBC News (16 January 2018) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/
business-42704291>: BBC News, ‘What are Supermarkets
Doing to Fight Plastic?’ BBC News (14 January 2018)
< w w w. b b c. c o. u k / n e w s / s c i e n c e - e nv i r o n m e n t -
42652937>.
7 Roger Harrabin, ‘UK Faces Build-up of  Plastic Waste’
BBC News (01 January 2018) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/
business-42455378>; Karen McVeigh, ‘Huge Rise in US
Plastic Waste Shipments to Poor Countries Following
China Ban’ The Guardian (5 October 2018)
<www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/
oct/05/huge-rise-us-plastic-waste-shipments-to-poor-
countries-china-ban-thailand-malaysia-vietnam>. China’s
prohibition on waste imports was pursuant to WTO
Notification G/TBT/N/CHN/1211 of 18 July 2017 and
G/TBT/N/CHN/1233 of 15 November 2017; most
recently: Hannah Ellis-Petersen, ‘Treated like Trash:
South-East Asia Vows to Return Mountains of  Rubbish
from West’ The Guardian (28 May 2019)
<www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/28/
treated-l ike-trash-south-east-as ia-vows-to-return-
mountains-of-rubbish-from-west>; BBC News, ‘Why
Some Countries are Shipping Back Plastic Waste’ BBC
News (2 June 2019) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
48444874>.
8 Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs,
Our Waste, Our Resources: A Strategy for England (18 December
2018) <www.gov.uk/government/publications/
resources-and-waste-strategy-for-england>.
9 Emily Holden and Aagencies, ‘Nearly All Countries
Agree to Stem Flow of  Plastic Waste into Poor Nations’
The Guardian (11 May 2019) <www.theguardian.com/
environment/2019/may/10/nearly-al l-the-worlds-
countries-sign-plastic-waste-deal-except-us> reporting on
the Meetings of the conferences of the parties to the
Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions, April-
May 2019, Geneva <www.brsmeas.org/2019COPs/
Overview/tabid/7523/language/en-US/Default.aspx>,
requiring government consent for importation of
plastics, notably the US has not agreed to this.
Economy for Plastics,10 which is discussed further
below.11
In general, these responses to plastics waste have
varied.12 At a technical level, there are responses such
as reducing the diversity of polymers (and thus making
it easier to recycle).13 There are also planned
prohibitions on the use of certain single-use plastics.14
This would be a laudable move, but it will not be a
panacea,15 especially as the ubiquity of plastics makes
widespread elimination arguably impossible.16 A more
subtle approach, which acknowledges the continuing
necessity of  plastic to the economy, might be that of
pricing plastics so they ‘reflect life-cycle costs’.17 The
rationale for this simple suggestion, that plastics
(whether as individual goods or as ingredient material
for complex artefacts) are currently priced so low as to
justify their abandonment after limited use, is
justifiable to an extent. However, such price increases
will invariably fall on end-users, which may not be the
fairest approach. More directly in the context of this
article, pricing goods to reflect their life-cycle costs will
not of itself aid moves towards circular economics.18
A circular economic approach would thus be to look
to supply-side mechanisms, such as altering the design,
production and use of goods to reduce the incidence
of waste, rather than merely taxing waste away at the
179
10 European Commission (Michiel de Smet and Mats Linder
eds), A Circular Economy for Plastics: Insights from research and
innovation to inform policy and funding decisions (2019) <https:/
/publications.europa.eu/s/mTES>.
11 Text following n 85.
12 See Resource Futures and Nextek, Eliminating Avoidable
Plastic Waste by 2042: A Use-Based Approach to Decision and
Policy Making  (June 2018) <ciwm-journal.co.uk/
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Eliminating-
avoidable-plastic-waste-by-2042-a-use-based-approach-to-
decision-and-policy-making.pdf>, 91 (a long-list of 57
potential interventions to improve plastics use efficiency).
13 DEFRA, Our waste, Our Resources: Evidence Annex (n 1) 108.
14 DEFRA, Our waste, Our Resources (n 8) 54; DEFRA, Our waste,
Our Resources: Evidence Annex (n 1) 113; Bernie Thomas,
George Cole and Howard Walker, A Preliminary Assessment
of the Economic, Environmental and Social Impacts of a Potential
Ban on Plastic Straws, Plastic Stem Cotton Buds and Plastics
Drinks Stir rers (May 2018) <http://randd.defra.gov.uk/
Document.aspx?Document=14326_Plasticstrawsstemcottonbudsa
ndstirrers.pdf>; European Commission, ‘Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Reduction of the Impact of Certain Plastic
Products on the Environment’, (Communication) COM
340 Final (2018) <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
c i r c u l a r - e c o n o m y / p d f / s i n g l e - u s e _ p l a s t i c s _
proposal.pdf>; David Shukman, ‘Straws: UK Government
to Bring in New Controls on Plastics’ BBC News (London,
22 May 2019) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-
environment-48358002> (controls on certain single use
plastics from April 2020).
15 Peter Maddox, ‘The Unintended Consequences of  a War
on Plastic’ (Wrap, 19 April 2018) <www.wrap.org.uk/blog/
2018/04/unintended-consequences-war-plastic>. It is also
worth noting that prohibitions on such goods may have
substantial negative consequences for people with
disabilities: Penny Pepper, ‘I Rely on Plastic Straws and
Baby Wipes, I’m Disabled – I have No Choice’ The Guardian
(9 July 2018) <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2018/jul/09/disabled-person-plastic-straws-baby-wipes>;
Vivian Ho, ‘“People Need Them”: The Trouble with the
Movement to Ban Plastic Straws’ The Guardian (25 August
2018) <www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/25/
plastic-straw-ban-california-people-with-disabilities>.
16 Anthony L Andrady and Mike A Neal, ‘Applications and
Societal Benefits of Plastics’ (2009) 364/1526
Philosophical Transactions of  the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences 1977. For illustration of the volumes
of plastic use, see Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘New
Plastics Economy (13 March 2019) <https://
new plast icseconomy.org/assets/doc/GC-Spr ing-
Report.pdf>. See also Tony Naylor, ‘Waitrose’s Package-
free Shopping is a PR Move that Will Change Little’ The
Guardian  (5 June 2019) <www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2019/jun/05/waitrose-packing-free-
shopping-pr-move-change-little>.
17 Sharon George, ‘Are the Days of  Recycling with a Clear
Conscience over?’ The Guardian (22 October 2018)
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/22/
recycling-fuels-consumption-plastic>.
18 cf Matthew Taylor, ‘Tax “Virgin Packaging” to Tackle
Plastics Crisis, says Report’ The Guardian (20 November
2018) <www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/nov/
20/tax-virgin-packaging-tackle-plastics-crisis-report>. The
report commissioned by the WWF and the Resource
Association, suggests a fee on virgin packaging and a
rebate system for recycling. The article concludes:
‘Campaigners say the recommendations of the new
report would be a step towards a so-called circular
economy – where fewer raw materials are used – creating
less environmental damage’.
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final consumption stage.19 The reduction of plastics
waste in circular economic context would thus occur
through, inter alia, increasing the incidence of plastics
recycling. Whilst it must be acknowledged that plastics
recycling has many technological hurdles,20 and has
seen increasing criminal activity,21 generally encouraging
such recycling would help reduce the environmental
impact of waste or surplus plastics in the first place. In
addition, circular economics would also require the
development of mechanisms to prevent the
generation of waste or surplus plastics; indeed this
may be the better option. In either case (increasing
recycling or preventing waste), it is necessary to consider
how to deal with plastics waste at early stages in
production processes, rather than at the end-use point.
The focus of this article is thus on commercial
transactions, with the aim of analysing how English
personal property law can help address the problem
of plastics waste, other than by means of simple
prohibitions, price manipulation, taxation,22  criminal
regulation,23 or other end-use-point mechanisms.
The approach suggested here is that current English
personal property law, specifically that concerning
retention of title clauses (ROTC), could provide a
suitable mechanism to achieve the necessary levels of
control to generate circular economic relationships with
the effect of reducing the generation of plastics waste.
The focus is on English law, because English
commercial law remains one of the primary systems
of commercial law in the world.24 English law is thus
likely to be of particular relevance to the clearly global
nature of the plastics and recycling trades. Economy
unfortunately prevents any comparative analysis here,
though it should be noted that English doctrine differs
considerably from that found around the common
law world, where the progeny of the United States’
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 on Security
Interests can be found in various different forms of
personal property security Acts.25 In particular the
doctrinal lodestar of this article, the ROTC, is treated
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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19 DEFRA, Our Waste, Our Resources (n 8) 26: ‘The ‘lifecycle’
approach complements the circular economy model. It
requires us to focus not just on managing waste
responsibly, but on preventing its creation in the first
place. It means taking into account how decisions taken
during the design stage – at the start of the lifecycle –
affect how a product is used and then disposed of by
the consumer. At every stage of  a product’s lifecycle
there is scope for people to do all they can to maximise
resource value and minimise waste’.
20 Roger Harrabin, ‘Recycled Packaging “May End up in
Landfill”, Warns Watchdog’ BBC News (23 July2018)
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-44905576>; Matt
McGrath, ‘Plastic Food Pots and Trays are Often
Unrecyclable, say Councils’ BBC News (4 August 2018)
< w w w. b b c . c o. u k / n ew s / s c i e n c e - e n v i ro n m e n t -
45058971>; Wesley Stephenson, ‘All the Plastic You Can
and Cannot Recycle’ BBC News (21 September 2018)
< w w w. b b c . c o. u k / n ew s / s c i e n c e - e n v i ro n m e n t -
45496884>; Oliver Franklin-Wallis, ‘“Plastic Recycling is
a Myth”: What Really Happens to Your Rubbish?’ The
Guardian (17 August 2019) <www.theguardian.com/
environment/2019/aug/17/plastic-recycling-myth-
what-really-happens-your-rubbish?>.
21 See eg Sandra Laville, ‘UK Plastics Recycling Industry
under Investigation for Fraud and Corruption’ The
Guardian (19 October 2018) <www.theguardian.com/
environment/2018/oct/18/uk-recycl ing-industry-
under-investigation-for-and-corruption>.
22 cf  DEFRA, Our Waste, Our Resources (n 8) 41 (noting how
the 2018 budget introduced a tax from April 2022 on
plastics with less than 30 per cent recycled content).
23 Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, A
Consultation on Proposals to Tackle Crime and Poor Performance in
the Waste Sector & Introduce a New Fixed Penalty for the Waste
Duty of  Care (January 2018) <https://consult.defra.gov.uk/
waste/crime-and-poor-performance-in-the-waste-sector/>.
24 See eg Gilles Cuniberti, ‘The International Market for
Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws’ (2014) 34
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business
455: English law is chosen most often by non-English
parties in arbitration disputes at the International Chamber
of  Commerce, though there is no clear reason why.
Furthermore, the commercial importance of London,
and the number of trade organisations based there, means
that often standard form contracts issued under the aegis
of such trade organisations or other commercial entities,
will (for good or for bad) reflect the English doctrinal
position: Michael Joachim Bonell, ‘The Law Governing
International Commercial Contracts and the Actual Role of
the Unidroit Principles’ (2018) 23 Uniform Law Review 15, 19.
25 See eg Gerard McCormack, Secured Credit under English and
American Law (CUP 2004); John de Lacy (ed), The Reform of
UK Personal Property Security Law: Comparative Perspectives
(Routledge  2010). It is acknowledged that later in this
article (text following n 128) there is some focus on New
Zealand doctrine. The cases analysed concerned the New
Zealand law, which was essentially the same as English
law, prior to the scheme adopted in the Personal Property
Securities Act 1999.
considerably differently under such schemes.26 This
difference along with the generally important role of
English law in commercial transactions provides a
strong justification for this article’s focus on English
law.
It should of course be obvious that the proposals
here are complementary to the variety of policy
measures that could be implemented to reduce plastics
waste; what is suggested herein is merely one of  a
number of possible mechanisms that could be utilised
to deal with plastics waste in a circular economic context.
Furthermore, these are tentative proposals; the specific
content of the agreed conditions under an ROTC that
could avoid the particular pitfalls that the current
doctrine presents are not easy to determine, and remain
to be substantively developed by both practitioners,
commercial actors, and academics. Nevertheless, it is
suggested that the proposals here would fit well within
the conceptual basis presented in the Evidence Annex
to the Waste Strategy, specifically in that it would be a
market-based instrument which would be flexible and
administratively feasible.27 Furthermore, the ROTC
approach may be useful in that the prevalence of such
terms in commercial contracts suggests a level of
commercial familiarity with the idea of retaining title,
and it is worth noting that there is a strong tendency
towards describing circular economic situations in
terms that very much resemble ROTC.28
The next section outlines the concept of waste, as well
as indicating how the control of goods is central to
the meaning of  waste in law, and to circular economics
in general. The formulation of control in terms of
ownership in circular economic literature will also be
noted. Because the assessment of something as waste
turns on the extent of  control, it is thus necessary, to
meet the circular economic ideal of eliminating waste,
to provide mechanisms for the exercise of sufficient
control so as to prevent waste or surplus plastics from
falling into the legal definition of waste. This leads to
the third section, which considers how English
personal property law could provide a doctrinal regime
for the long-term control of goods, using the
possibilities offered by ROTC. This will show the
possibility of constructing transactional frameworks
that reduce the possibility of waste and allow for the
recapture of surplus, in order to enhance the take-up
of circular economic practices.
2
WASTE IN LAW AND IN CIRCULAR
ECONOMY
Waste is a cyclical concept, involving multiple stages;29
thus, regulation of waste can (and arguably must) be
directed to the various stages of that cycle and not just
at the end-point of disposal. This, along with the
complicated relationship of domestic, European and
international legal regimes on waste, makes the
meaning of waste very difficult to understand.30 This
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26 D E Murray, ‘The Unpaid Seller’s Reservation of  Title
under the Romalpa Clause is Not Effective in America’
[1981] LMCLQ 278.
27 DEFRA, Our Waste, Our Resources: Evidence Annex (n 1),
Appendix 3: Policy Instrument Choice, 128-130.
28 See eg G Hieminga, Rethinking Finance in a Circular Economy:
Financial Implications of Circular Business Models (May 2015)
<http://www.ing.com/About-us/Ourstories/Features/
Circu lar -economy-cha l lenges- f inanc ia l -bus iness-
models.htm>; explored further in S Thomas, ‘Circular
Economy, Title, and Harmonisation of  Commercial Law’
in O Akseli and J Lineralli (eds), The Future of Commercial
Law: Ways Forward for Harmonisation (Hart Publishing
(forthcoming)).
29 lona Cheyne and Michael Purdue, ‘Fitting Definition to
Purpose: The Search for a Satisfactory Definition of
Waste’ (1995) 7 Journal of  Environmental Law 149, 151:
‘Waste Imanagement is therefore concerned not only
with the final disposal or dumping of waste but with
the whole cycle of waste creation, transport, storage,
treatment and recovery in order to prevent polluting
harm from coming about’.
30 David Wilkinson, ‘Time to Discard the Concept of
Waste?’ (1999) 1 Environmental Law Review 172, 173-
177; Stephan Tromans, ‘EC Waste Law—A Complete
Mess?’ (2001) 13 Journal of Environmental Law 133, 155;
Julie Adshead, ‘The Waste Strategy for England 2007: Is It
Deliverable?’ (2008) 10 Environmental Law Review 46.
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Second, there is the obvious issue of Brexit: the
immense complexity and current and continuing
(September 2019) uncertainty means that it will not be
addressed directly. It is worth briefly noting that circular
economy, and plastics, are entirely absent from the
current draft UK-EU Withdrawal agreement.35 Within
that draft agreement there is simply reference to non-
retrogression in relation to inter alia waste
management.36 However, the December 2018 Waste
Strategy suggests possible commonality between UK
and EU strategy, with the UK Government aiming to
match and where possible exceed relevant EU law on
plastics waste (as well as circular economy matters).37
As to the general EU movements on circular economy,
these will not be addressed either. This is because to
do so would be to go outside the specific direction of
this article. Moreover, a reading of the relevant
documentation produced by the EU clearly indicates
that the specific aspect considered in this article – the
potential to use ROTC in English personal property
law (or indeed, any specific doctrine of English personal
property law) as means to deal with waste – is not
addressed at any point. However, as will be seen
soon,38 in the context of a general understanding of
the regulatory framework on waste the approach
suggested by this article is valid notwithstanding its
absence from the EU documentation.
The basic regulatory framework is provided by the
2008 Waste Directive,39 which ‘clarifies but [also] resets
the waste hierarchy’.40 The waste hierarchy is a simple
concept: goods should be prevented from being
article will not provide a waste taxonomy,31 or an
exhaustive examination of the definition of waste.32
Instead, a brief outline of some key elements of that
concept within the broad context of UK and EU law
is provided.33 It is acknowledged that there are two
factors that render this area highly fluid. First, there are
continuing developments at the EU level concerning
the implementation of circular economics, both
generally and in the specific context of plastics.34
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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31 cf  Eva Pongrácz and Veikko J Pohjola, ‘De-defining
Waste, the Concept of  Ownership and the Role of  Waste
Management’ (2004) 40 Resources, Conservation and
Recycling 141.
32 See eg Jurgen Fluck, ‘The Term “Waste” in EU Law’
[1994] European Environmental Law Review 79; Ilona
Cheyne, ‘The Definition of  Waste in EC Law’ (2002) 14
Journal of Environmental Law 61; David Pocklington,
‘Opening Pandora’s Box - the EU Review of  the
Definition of  “Waste”’ [2003] European Environmental
Law Review 205; Eloise Scotford, ‘Trash or Treasure:
Policy Tensions in EC Waste Regulation’ (2007) 19 Journal
of Environmental Law 367; Robert Lee and Ellen Stokes,
‘Rehabilitating the Definition of  Waste: Is It Fully
Recovered?’  (2008) 8 Year Book of  European
Environmental Law 162; Richard Burnett-Hall and Brian
Jones (gen eds), Burnett-Hall on Environmental Law (3rd
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) ch 14. See also Science and
Technology Committee, Waste Reduction (HL 2007-08, 163-
I), <www.gov.uk/government/publications/legal-
definition-of-waste-guidance/decide-if-a-material-is-
waste-or-not>.
33 See also Eloise AK Scotford and Jonathan Robinson,
‘UK Environmental Legislation and Its Administration
in 2013 – Achievements, Challenges and Prospects’
(2013) 25 Journal of Environmental Law 383.
34 See eg European Commission, ‘Review of  Waste Policy
and Legislation’(7 August 2019) <http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/waste/target_review.htm> (noting the
‘revised legislative proposals on waste to stimulate
Europe’s transition towards a circular economy’);
European Commission, ‘Implementation of the Circular
Economy Action Plan’ (7 August 2019) <http://
ec . europa .eu/env i ronment/c i rcu l a r -economy/>
(noting the EU’s Circular Economy Action Plan);
European Commission, A European Strategy for Plastics in
a Cir cular Economy,  COM (2018) 28 f inal <eur-
l e x . e u r o p a . e u / l e g a l - c o n t e n t / E N / T X T /
?qid=1516265440535&uri=COM:2018:28:FIN>; European
Commission, Proposal for a Directive of  the European Parliament
and of the Council on the reduction of the impact of certain plastic
products on the environment, (Communication) COM 340
Final (2018) <ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-
economy/pdf/single-use_plastics_proposal.pdf>.
35 Draft Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from
the European Union and the European Atomic Energy
Community (14 November 2018).
36 ibid Annex 4, Part Two, Article 2(1). This Annex exists
with ‘a view to ensuring the maintenance of the level
playing field conditions required for the proper
functioning of [Article 6(1), setting out the single
customs territory of the UK]’.
37 DEFRA, Our Waste, Our Resources (n 8) 18, 22.
38 See text following n 48.
39 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and
of  the Council on Waste and Repealing Certain
   Directives (OJ L312/3 2008) (Waste Directive).
40 Eloise Scotford, ‘The New Waste Directive - Trying to
Do It All ... an Early Assessment’ (2009) 11 Environmental
Law Review 75, 75-76.
wasted, re-used, recycled, subjected to other forms of
recovery (eg energy recovery through incineration)
before finally being disposed of as waste. However,
Scotford notes that any ‘clarity’ derived from the explicit
setting out of priorities of waste is ‘complicated’ by
qualifications of that prioritisation,41 and the
delegation of assessment of the waste life-cycle to
Member States ‘according to their own methodologies
and understandings of this concept’.42 The
overreaching ambition of  the Waste Directive could
only be met through an overly broad definition of
waste: ‘any substance or object which the holder discards
or intends or is required to discard’,43 and waste holders
as ‘the waste producer or the natural or legal person
who is in possession of the waste’.44 Broadly put, it
ties the meaning of  waste to the holder’s monetary
valuation.45 The Directive also attempts to shift
behaviour towards waste minimisation, and viewing
waste as a resource rather than a burden.46
Four broad points can thus be made: (1) a broadly
objective approach is taken to assessing whether
something is waste;47 (2) reuse of waste is neither
automatically protected nor is it intrinsically necessary;48
(3) assessing whether waste ceases to be waste is at
least partly focused on a market-exchange
assessment;49 and (4) waste regulation focuses on the
control of goods,50 with the act of discarding
remaining key.51 The centrality of  control, and
commodification of waste, in this regulatory
framework illustrates the commercialised conception
of  waste policy. As will be seen, circular economics
very much rest on the notion of waste as a valuable
commodity. In this sense there appears considerable
conceptual and policy similarity between the pre-existing
waste framework and circular economics, such that
circular economic practices should be relatively easily
developed within this regulatory framework. To
achieve such developments though would require
recognition of the importance of Member States’
capacity to meet the Waste Directive obligations
through ‘their own methodologies and
understandings’ of the concept of the waste life-cycle.52
This is the jumping-off point for this article.
It is suggested that one way in which we can understand
the waste-life cycle is a process by which the diffusion
of ownership results in a loss of control of goods
such that they become waste.53 The term ‘diffusion
of ownership’ may appear loaded with jurisprudential
niceties, but it is simply used to indicate that a loss of
control can arise by the processes of sale and purchase:
the transference of ownership rights from one party
to another down a chain of transactions has the effect
of shifting control down that form a chain in roughly
the same order. This is a very crude approximation of
the reality of commercial consumption of goods.
Whilst it is acknowledged that English law does not
automatically connect ownership with possession, the
practical reality is that the two are intimately connected.
Thus, by selling goods, the vendor is giving up control
of the goods to the vendee. Thus, the purpose of
this article is to argue that there is a potentially valuable
183
41 ibid 80, 85 (discussing Directive 2008/98/EC, art. 4(1),
(2)).
42 ibid 81. For an earlier critique of  the EU’s approaches,
see eg Enrique Tueft-Opi, ‘Life After End of Life: The
Replacement of End of Life Product Legislation by an
European Integrated Product Policy in the EC’ (2002) 14
Journal of Environmental Law 33.
43 Waste Directive, art 3(1).
44 ibid art 3(2).
45 Thus following the basic principles outlined by
Carnwath LJ in R (OSS Group Ltd) v Environment Agency
[2007] EWCA Civ 611; [2007] Bus LR 1732.
46 Scotford (n 40) 79-80.
47 The Environment Agency v Short [1999] JPL 263; [1999] PELB
   18.
48 Although reuse is a priority in the waste hierarchy, factors
relating to the financial and technical competence of
waste disposal actors, the ease of regulatory oversight
and the nature of the waste itself may mean landfilling
is the preferred regulatory option: Department of
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, A consultation on
proposals to tackle crime and poor performance in the waste sector &
introduce a new fixed penalty for the waste duty of care (January
2018) <https://consult.defra.gov.uk/waste/crime-and-
poor-performance-in-the-waste-sector/>. See also eg R
v Ezeemo [2012] EWCA Crim 2064; [2013] 4 All ER 1016
(trade in sending electrical goods dumped in tips in the
UK for refurbishment in Nigeria was held to be in
breach of EU law concerning waste transfers).
49 Waste Directive, art 6 (1)(b).
50 Tromans  (n 30) 136.
51 Scotford (n 40) 82; Long v Brooke [1980] Crim L Rev
109, 110.
52 ibid.
53 For a theoretical explanation, see Michael Thompson,
Rubbish Theory: The Creation and Destruction of  Value
(Pluto Press [1979] 2017).
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mechanism within English personal property law that
enables parties to maintain control despite plastics
being transferred down a transactional chain.
2.1 Circular Economics and
Plastic Waste
Circular economics is a heterodox ideology, as shown
by the multiple potential visions of circular economic
practices.54 It has a wide range of manufacturing and
transactional models and forms, aiming at different
objectives from environmental sustainability to cost
minimisation and product and data ownership and
control. This article is not the place to outline what
circular economics is or its importance. Nevertheless,
the clear growing governmental interest in circular
economics,55 means the impact of specific legal frame
works and substantive doctrines on circular economic
practices will likely become a key point of tension in
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the future development of circular economic
thinking.56
One common refrain in circular economics concerns
the capacity to eliminate waste. How this is phrased
varies according to context.57 The general circular
economic ideals concerning waste have been given focus
for plastics waste by means of the 2016 New Plastics
Economy Initiative,58 a project led by the Ellen
MacArthur Foundation.59 Two reports underline the
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54 See Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘Circular Economy:
Concept’ <www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/circular-
economy/concept>; Walter R Stahel, ‘The Circular
Economy’ (Nature 23 March 2016) <www.nature.com/
news/the-circular-economy-1.19594>; Michael Braungart
and William McDonough, Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the
Way We Make Things (Vintage [2002] 2009). From a business
perspective, see Peter Lacy and Jakob Rutqvist, Waste to
Wealth: The Circular Economy Advantage (Palgrave MacMillan
2015); Julian Kirchherr, Denise Reike and Marko Hekkert,
‘Conceptualizing the Circular Economy: An Analysis of
114 Definitions’ (2017) 127 Resources, Conservation &
Recycling 221; Callie Babbitt and others (eds), ‘Sustainable
Resource Management and the Circular Economy’ (2018)
135 Resources, Conservation and Recycling 1 et seq.
55 See eg DEFRA, Our Waste, Our Resources (n 8); ibid, Ellen
MacArthur Foundation: The necessarily global nature
of waste and circular economy is reflected in eg The
Memorandum of Understanding on Circular Economy
Between the European Commission and the National
Development and Reform Commission of  the People’s
Republic of China (16 July 2018) <http://ec.europa.eu/
e n v i r o n m e n t / c i r c u l a r - e c o n o m y / p d f /
circular_economy_MoU_EN.pdf>. See also Ellen
MacArthur Foundation, ‘China-EU Agreement Paves Way
for Global Adoption of Circular Economy’
<www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/news/china-eu-
agreement-paves-way-for-global-adoption-of-circular-
economy>.
56 As implied by the growing legal literature on circular
economy: Florin Bonciu, ‘The European Economy: From
a Linear to a Circular Economy’ (2014) 14 Romanian Journal
of European Affairs 78; Carl Dalhammar, ‘The Application
of “Life Cycle Thinking” in European Environmental
Law: Theory and Practice’ (2015) 12 Journal of European
Environmental & Planning Law 97; Thomas J de Römph,
‘Terminological Challenges to the Incorporation of
Landfill Mining in EU Waste Law in View of  the Circular
Economy’ (2016) 25 European Energy and Environmental
Law Review 106; Katrien Steenmans, Jane Marriott and
Rosalind Malcolm, ‘Commodification of  Waste: Legal and
Theoretical Approaches to Industrial Symbiosis as part
of a Circular Economy’ (University of Oslo Faculty of
Law Research Paper No. 2017-26, 2017) <ssrn.com/
abstract=2983631>; Chris Backes, Law for a Circular Economy
(Eleven International Publishing 2017) <www.uu.nl/sites/
d e f a u l t / f i l e s / r g l - u c o w s l - b a c k e s -
law_for_a_circular_economy.pdf>; Sean Thomas, ‘Law,
Smart Technology, and Circular Economy: All Watched
Over by Machines of  Loving Grace?’ (2018) 10 Law,
Innovation & Technology 230; Jukka T Mähönen,
‘Financing Sustainable Market Actors in Circular
Economy’ (26 October 2018) University of Oslo Faculty
of Law Research Paper No 2018-28 <ssrn.com/
abstract=3273263>; Sean Thomas, ‘Law and the Circular
Economy’ [2019] JBL 62; Michael Burger, ‘Materials
Consumption and Solid Waste’ in Michael B Gerrard and
John Dernbach (eds), Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization
in the United States (ELI Books 2018) <ssrn.com/
abstract=3276245>; Thomas, ‘Circular Economy, Title, and
Harmonisation of Commercial Law’ (n 28); Eléonore
Maitre-Ekern and Carl Dalhammar, ‘Towards a Hierarchy
of Consumption Behaviour in the Circular Economy’
(2019) 26 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative
Law 394.
57 See eg Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘Circular Economy:
Concept’ <www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/circular-
economy/concept>: ‘design waste out of the system’.
58 Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘The Initiative’
<newplasticseconomy.org/about/the-initiative>.
59  Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘Our Mission is to
Accelerate the Transition to a Circular Economy’
<www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/>.
New Plastics Economy Initiative: Rethinking the Future
of Plastics,60 and Catalysing Action.61 Building on the
evidence base provided by these reports as to the
impact of plastics waste, and the potential for circular
economic practices to help reduce and eliminate the
problematic aspects of plastics, the Ellen MacArthur
Foundation launched a Plastics Pact, whereby local
organisations would help reduce and eliminate plastics
waste alongside increasing the recycling and reuse of
plastics.62 Further developments in this area resulted
in the October 2018 launch for the New Plastics
Economy Global Commitment.63 That document set
out that ‘A systemic shift tackling the root causes is
required: a transition towards a circular economy for
plastic, in which plastic never becomes waste’.64 This
in turn reflects the Rethinking the Future of plastics
report, which states ‘[t]he overarching vision of the
New Plastics Economy is that plastics never become
waste; rather, they re-enter the economy as valuable
technical or biological nutrients’.65 The Commitment
reflects and refines the targets set out in Plastics Pact to
three main objectives:66 elimination of unnecessary
plastics; innovative designs for safe reuse, recycling, or
composting plastics; and circulation of plastics ‘in the
economy and out of the environment’.67
This article focuses on the third objective – the
circularity aspect. This is because it must be
acknowledged, as it is within the literature just
mentioned, that elimination of  plastics is unlikely.
Thus, developing mechanisms to embed circular
economic practices in the manufacture and use of
plastics is essential, not just for dealing with plastics
but for dealing with plastics wastes as well. This is
where legal responses, including those concerning
ownership, become essential to the success of  circular
economy. However, in common with circular economic
literature in general,68 the legal aspects of developing
and implementing circular economic practices regarding
plastics waste are not expressed with clarity or
cer tainty.69 The Global Commitment makes no
mention of  ownership, or of  law or legal aspects
directly.70 The Catalysing Action report fails to mention
legal issues concerning ownership; the references to
legal aspects in general are noticeable by their absence.71
The report Rethinking the Future of Plastics has a section
on legal responses to circular economics,72 though what
is noticeable is how that section merely identifies a
variety of regulatory actions, almost entirely in the form
of legislative prohibitions on types of (invariably
single-use) plastics, such as carrier bags or takeaway
food containers. There is a brief reference to the
potential benefit from alteration of public
procurement rules as a demand-side ‘pull’ towards
circular economic plastics usage.73 However, there is
nothing on the substantive doctrine, nor on whether
current doctrinal positions could have a viable role in
promoting circular economic practices.
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60 World Economic Forum, Ellen MacArthur Foundation
and McKinsey & Company, The New Plastics Economy
– Rethinking the Future of Plastics (2016)
<newplasticseconomy.org/about/publications/report-
2016>.
61 World Economic Forum, Ellen MacArthur Foundation
and McKinsey & Company, The New Plastics Economy
– Catalysing Action (2017) <newplasticseconomy.org/
about/publications/report-2017>; most recently, see
Ellen MacArthur Foundation, <https://
newplast icseconomy.org/assets/doc/GC-Spr ing-
Report.pdf> (13 March 2019).
62 <newplasticseconomy.org/projects/plastics-pact>. The
UK charity WRAP delivered the first such
implementation of  this Pact: <www.wrap.org.uk/
content/the-uk-plastics-pact>.
63 Ellen MacArthur Foundation, ‘New Plastics Economy
Global Commitment’ <newplasticseconomy.org/assets/
doc/global-commitment-download.pdf>.
64 ibid 1.
65 Rethinking the Future of Plastics (n 60) 18.
66 The Commitment also acknowledges that it ‘will build
on, and reinforce’ other actions relating to plastics waste,
including the EU strategy for plastics in a circular
economy.
67 New Plastics Economy Global Commitment (n 63) 1.
68 See eg Mickey Howard and Ken Webster, ‘Circular
Business Advantage: What Organisations Need to Know’
(24 October 2018) https://medium.com/circulatenews/
circular-business-advantage-what-organisations-need-to-
know-c7ae1954cc46 (noting, inter alia, how ‘Product
ownership will become a thing of the past’).
69 Designing Law and Policy Towards Managing Plastics in
a Circular Economy (SOAS Workshop, London, 2 June
2018) <https://www.soas.ac.uk/ledc/events/plastics-
2018/>.
70 It does mention regulations in the context of  food safety,
but without any explanation.
71 Catalysing Action (n 61) 40 very briefly mentions laws
concerning plastic packaging.
72 Rethinking the Future of Plastics (n 60) 37.
73 ibid 60-61.
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December 2018 saw the publication of a new waste
strategy for England, one which importantly, integrates
circular economic thinking in dealing with waste.74 It
also specifically reflects on plastics waste, and provides
numerous valuable policy suggestions to reduce and
eliminate plastics waste.75 At the heart of the various
suggestions is recognition of  the importance of
preventing waste in the first place,76 which involves
not only improving design to enhance plastic
recyclability,77 but also developing ‘regulatory or
economic instruments if necessary and appropriate’.78
One ‘radical’ aspect of the regulatory response is an
enhanced concept of  producer responsibility,79
founded on the ‘polluter pays’ principle.80 Where there
is an application of this principle through extended
producer responsibility, giving commercial parties the
capacity though the utilisation of legal frameworks to
control their outputs and thus avoid the generation
of waste, can be seen as corollary to that principle. The
negative incentive on producers to eliminate waste (i.e.,
if they fail to eliminate waste, then they pay) can be
matched with a positive incentive. That is, there
arguably need to be incentives for commercial
organisations to recapture waste, including plastics, in
order to recycle such products and reintegrate them
within the (circular) economy and thus gain the benefits
of utilising such resources.81 Related are the concepts
of reverse logistics and back-hauling of packaging: this
involves companies reacquiring their products
(including packaging) in order to prevent their
wastage.82 Similarly, there is the problematic issue of
achieving ‘end of waste’ status, that is, where
something that was waste is transformed so that it is
no longer waste.83
This is of considerable importance given the current
legal obligations to treat waste in particular ways in
accordance with the Waste Directive. However, the
specific implications for the legal doctrine concerning
ownership are as unclear here as in the other reports
concerning plastics and circular economics (as noted
above). There appears to be a general assumption that
shifting from ownership to other forms of
transactions which involve retaining ownership is
necessarily good.84 Moreover, there appears to be a
failure to recognise that the structure of the English
doctrine on retaining ownership is not clear, and that
this is particularly the case when it comes to providing
circular economic transactional structures for plastics.
Most recently, in March 2019 the EU published a
substantial document A Circular Economy for Plastics,85
which begins by noting inter alia ‘[c]urrent laws and
regulations are insufficient to enable cross-value-chain
collaboration … policy innovations are needed to
remove regulatory and legal barriers to system-wide
collaboration’.86 Amongst the policy recommendations
are to ‘[d]evelop, harmonise and enforce regulatory
and legal frameworks guided by systems thinking to
connect the different actors of the plastics value
chain(s)’.87 Notwithstanding the current Brexit
position (or lack thereof), the recognition of the
importance of  developing law, or as this article suggests
utilising current doctrine, as one of a number of
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74 September 2019 saw the publication of plans for a Circular
Economy Bill before the Scottish Parliament: https://
www.gov.scot/publications/protecting-scotlands-future-
governments-programme-scotland-2019-20/pages/4/.
Unfortunately, there is a lack of  detail at this stage, though
there has already been some criticism for the Bill’s focus
on waste recovery rather than reducing consumption:
Richard Dixon, ‘Climate Emergency Programme for
Government Fails to Make the Grade’ (Friends of  the Earth,
3 September 2019) <https://foe.scot/press-release/
climate-emergency-programme-for-government-fails-
make-grade-scot-pfg/>.
75 DEFRA, Our Waste, Our Resources (n 8). See also DEFRA,
Our Waste, Our Resources: Evidence Annex (n 1).
76  See George (n17).
77   DEFRA, Our Waste, Our Resources (n 8) 26.
78  ibid 17.
79  Marcus Gover, ‘Resources and Waste Strategy: A Major
Step Forward, With Lots to Do’ (17 December 2018)
<www.wrap.org.uk/blog/2018/12/resources-and-waste-
strategy-major-step-forward-lots-do>.
80  See e.g. Burnett-Hall on Environmental Law (n 32) [2-116]-
[2-225].
81 cf Burnett-Hall on Environmental Law (n32):2-118 ‘The
[polluter pays] principle is thus in essence an economic
instrument, intended inter alia to promote the
rectification at source principle’.
82  DEFRA, Our Waste, Our Resources (n 8) 48-49.
83  ibid 81.
84  ibid 30; 37; 55.
85  EC (n 10).
86  ibid 10.
87  ibid 11.
diffusion of ownership down the chain. This will give
the initiator the power to control transactions, as well
as the capacity to more effectively direct the use and
recapture surplus plastics, thereby avoiding the
generation of plastics waste. This is on the basis that
the party with the legal title to an asset is the party with
the capacity to enforce obligations as against third
parties, and not just those with whom they have
contracted. For the purposes of  clarity, this argument
is focused on working out ways by which parties can
structure their commercial relationships to allow for
voluntary recapture of waste plastics. It is not concerned
with providing justifications for the imposition of
obligations to recapture waste plastics.
3
CONTROLLING GOODS TO AVOID
WASTE
The previous section pointed out the importance of
control within the regulation of waste (under the
Waste Directive), as well as to circular economics. This
is not the place to examine deeply what is meant by
control, but ‘control’ in the context of waste law
appears to be concerned with alteration of the physical
status of goods. This will suffice for these purposes,
because this is sufficient to analogise with the level of
control that holders of proprietary interests in goods
have. Achieving the levels of control necessary to (a)
avoid goods being treated as waste and (b) effect circular
economic practices will require transactional
mechanisms and forms which allow for control of
goods down a chain of  transactions. Specifically, sellers
of goods should be able to control the use of such
goods, to the extent that they can recapture the goods
from down-chain users if they are being used (or risk
being used) in a manner inappropriate to circular
economy.
What follows is an examination of the potential of
ROTC to operate as a recirculating looping mechanism
in the circular economic process; a means by which
waste can be recaptured (to avoid it being disposed of
as waste, to allow it to be reused as a material input).
In particular, the historical basis of ROT illustrates
possible ways to develop circular economic practices
for waste plastics is clear. In particular, and in common
with the general tenor of writing about the circular
economy,88 there is the suggestion that ‘the biggest
challenge … lies in … changing prevailing concepts
such as ownership’,89 but there is a recognised gap in
knowledge about how to achieve business practices
which incorporate circular economic practices regarding
ownership.90 Indeed, the term ‘ownership’ is barely
used in the report.91
This article thus examines the extent to which English
law can provide circular economic transactional
structures for plastics, specifically so that plastics waste
is reduced. The English doctrine on ROTC arguably
provides an appropriate framework, as it allows for
the generation of commercial transactional forms
which concentrate ownership in the initiator of a circular
economic transaction,92 rather than allowing for
Personal Property Law for a Zero-Waste Circular Economy
187
88 See eg Technopolis Group, ‘Regulatory Barriers for the
Circular Economy: Lessons from Ten Case Studies (30
June 2016) <www.technopolis-group.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/03/2288-160713-Regulary-barriers-for-the-
circular-economy_accepted_HIres.pdf> 52: ‘The
employment of leasing schemes for various products or
servitisation is as another option to increase circularity.
When the producer remains the owner and is responsible
for maintenance their incentive is to maximise a product’s
lifetime and repairability. They are also incentivised to
keep track of leased products in order to retrieve them
for further treatment which limits illegal exports’
89 ibid 89.
90 ibid 92-93. Instead there is often rather beguiling statements
such as this (at 98): ‘In the product-service system concept,
products and materials often remain the property of the
companies. This ownership creates an incentive for
designing the products so that they can be optimally
reused, refurbished or recycled’.
91 Ownership is referred to in the pages cited immediately
above. Property, as understood through the lens of
‘personal property’ is not mentioned, though in an amusing
instance, the term property is used (at 131), correctly in
its context as a scientific concept relating to plastics, and
(this author is sure) unintentionally correctly in the context
of the English doctrine: ‘if the used resin collected ends
up being reprocessed to be recovered in a substantially
different type of application, the property requirements
may be very different’. For the doctrine, see below at text
following (n 128).
92 For a suggested nomenclature of  circular economy, see
eg Thomas, ‘Law and the Circular Economy’ (n 56) 62, 63
(instead of ‘seller’ and ‘buyer’, a better terminology might
be ‘initiator’ and ‘users’ within a circular economic chain
of transactions).
that control of the goods is a substantive part of the
doctrine. That is, ROT doctrine does not solely focus
on providing the ROT seller with a power to protect
their economic investment in the goods concerned:
there is more to ROT than mere economic protection
against the buyer’s insolvency. In this sense, a ROTC,
much like any other security interest, enables the ROT
seller to prevent the asset from being disposed of or
treated in a way which would reduce or otherwise
negatively impact on the secured party’s rights over
such asset.
Following this explanation is analysis of the issues
concerning the transformation of goods in a
manufacturing process; it will be argued that there is a
necessary conflict between property rights and
contractual agreements, but that the arguments against
accounting for a party’s intention are insufficient.
Instead, it is suggested that there is nothing in principle
preventing an ROTC from following through into
manufactured goods. Following that, the next sub-
section will briefly outline the Bunkers case, and will
suggest that that jurisprudence indicates a way by which
party autonomy, in terms of  the retention of  title and
its effects, can be enhanced and effectively applied in
the specific context of plastics, so as to provide a
mechanism for the avoidance of waste plastics.
3.1 Retention of Title
Under English law sellers can ‘reserve the right of
disposal of the goods until certain conditions are
fulfilled’.93 It needs to be recognised that the meaning
of the ‘right to disposal’ is rather obscure. It could be
that draftsman Sir Mackenzie Chalmers’ use of ‘right
of disposal’, rather than ‘right of property’ may
indicate an element of breadth to the power provided
by section 19 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893. In the
first edition of his text, The Law of Sales Chalmers
said the term ‘reserves the right of  disposal’ comes
from Mirabita v The Imperial Ottoman Bank, where
Cotton LJ said that the seller ‘reserves to himself  a
power of disposing of the property’.94 Chalmers
noted that in Mirabita, Bramwell LJ had talked of the
seller having both a property and a jus disponendi.95
Chalmers explained this as dealing with situations
where the seller intends to pass the property, the goods
are delivered on ‘such terms’ i.e., with jus disponendi, ‘as
to prolong the right of stoppage in transitu, and in
that sense a limited right of disposal may be said to be
reserved’.96 This remained the same in the second
edition, following the Sale of Goods Act 1893.97 This
suggests that the right of  disposal is limited to a right
to stoppage in transit. This makes sense in the context
of the Mirabita case, which involved transfers of
commercial paper and documents of title. However,
is there a substantive difference between that situation
and the sort of situation involving ROTC faced by
the courts a century or so later, including the sort of
situation this article is specifically concerned with? More
precisely, is there reason to think that the right of
disposal may have a broader application in the present
context?
Going back in time, it is clear from Benjamin that the
issue of the jus disponendi was ‘often a matter of great
nicety to determine whether or not the vendor’s
purpose or intention was really to reserve a jus
disponendi’.98 This is worth briefly considering because
93 Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 19 (1). This is distinct from an
ordinary contractual provision whereby goods are to be
returned to seller upon a designated event, such as failure
to export within a period: DFS Australia Pty Ltd v
Comptroller-General of Customs [2017] FCA 547 [72].
94 (1878) 3 ExD 164 (CA) 172. HHJ Chalmers, The Sale of
Goods including the Factors Act 1889 (London, William
Clowes and Sons 1890) 34; see also The Annie Johnson
[1918] P 154, 163 (Sir Samuel Evans P): ‘It is well known
that these portions of the Act were founded on the
judgment of Cotton LJ’; A P Bell, Modern Law of Personal
Property in England and Ireland (Butterworths 1989) 252, fn
2: ‘this is just another way of saying that property is not
to pass’; cf Samuel Williston, The Law Governing Sale of
Goods at Common Law and under the Uniform Sales Act (2nd
edn, Baker, Voorhis & Co, New York 1924) vol 1, 633, fn
4, noting that the American legislation followed the Sale
of Goods Act 1893, except for the somewhat loose
phrase ‘right of disposal’ is substituted ‘possession or
property’. Williston goes on to provide a detailed
examination of the flawed nature of Mirabita.
95 (1878) 3 ExD 164 (CA) 169-170.
96 Chalmers ( n 94) 35.
97 ibid 44-45.
98 J P Benjamin, A Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal
Property; with Reference to the American Decisions and to the
French Code and Civil Law (Henry Sweet, London 1868)
273.
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it is clear that the right of disposal, the Sale of Goods
Act 1893 s.19 provision which has followed through
to the Sale of Goods Act 1979, was very much
Chalmers’ creation. Benjamin’s approach is significant
in that it would appear that there was no specific right
of disposal of the sort found in s19. Instead, what
we can do is look to the way the jus disponendi was
understood, to perhaps gain a better understanding
of how Bramwell LJ was using it.
Within Benjamin’s discussion is an intriguing case
Craven v Ryder.99 There was an action for trover, for
goods sold on credit terms. It was proven that the
specific form of receipt had been adopted specifically
‘for the express purpose of giving the shipper a
command over the goods’ until payment.100 Gibbs
CJ said that ‘the holder of that receipt retains a control
over the goods at least until he has exchanged the
receipt for the bill of lading … the Plaintiffs might
refrain from delivering the goods, unless under such
circumstances as would enable them to recall the goods
if they saw occasion’.101 Benjamin said that ‘[t]his
seems to be but another mode of describing what, in
more recent cases, is termed a reservation of  the jus
disponendi’.102 It may be suggested though that what
this shows is that the term jus disponenedi was being
utilised to cover a range of situations ever so slightly
wider than stoppage in transit, to cover those cases
where the vendor is attempting to control the goods.
Moreover, it is important to cover those cases that are
wider than stoppage in transit, by which we are
necessarily meaning those cases other than those of
buyer insolvency, since stoppage in transit is limited to
such cases.103 The difference is that the right here, jus
disponendi, is one attendant to the seller’s right to retain
the property. This is distinct from a right attendant on
the capacity to halt delivery up in the event of
determining that the price will not be paid up. Put
simply, one can control the shipment, or the goods
themselves.104 The jus disponendi was thus about
controlling the goods specifically, and was very much
relevant where the parties had explicitly introduced
elements of control to the contractual agreement.
Whilst an ROTC is usually (perhaps even invariably)
framed so that the conditional aspect is the payment
of the price (and thus the ROT transaction is a form
of  secured credit), the reservation of  the right to
disposal may be able to provide more to a seller than
protection as against a buyer’s insolvency. The very
statutory wording, and the historical background,
suggests that there may be other possible uses for
ROTC. That is, it may be possible to combine the
retained title with a condition concerning something
other than payment. Fundamentally, the ROTC
provides the seller with an element of control over the
goods. The ROTC cases have, unsurprisingly, been
focused on the monetary aspect: how the seller’s control
generates protection as against the buyer’s insolvency.
At the same time, there has not been an overarching
commercial policy reason to control the goods for other
purposes; certainly, no policy as dominant as that of
protection against counterparty insolvency. However,
the rapid and substantial increase in commercial interest
in circular economics, alongside actual commercial
practices where parties are apparently retaining
ownership to generate circular economic transactions,
provides evidence of a new and increasingly important
commercial policy reason to enable sellers to control
goods. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that this
is not a zero-sum policy game: ROTC can both protect
against insolvency and provide down-chain
transactional control at the same time.
That an ROTC can have such a broader purpose is not
entirely obvious, but it can be discerned from various
sources. ROTCs provide a proprietary protection,
because the reservation of  title means the seller retains
99 (1816) 6 Taunt 433; 128 ER 1103, at Benjamin, Sale of
Personal Property (n 98) 275-276.
100 (1816) 6 Taunt 433, 433-434; 128 ER 1103, 1103.
101 (1816) 6 Taunt 433, 435; 128 ER 1103, 1103.
102 Benjamin, Sale of Personal Property (n 98) 276.
103 cf Iwan Davies, Effective Retention of Title (Fourmat
Publishing 1991) 46: ‘The whole purpose of the
retention of title clause is that it is not limited in this
way’.
104 cf Benjamin (n 98) 566: ‘can the vendor exercise a quasi
right of stoppage in transitu, - a right that might perhaps
be termed a stoppage ante-transitum?’ See also at 578: ‘his
Lordship was very emphatic in repudiating any
supposed analogy with stoppage in transitu [and the
unpaid vendor’s lien], citing McEwan v Smith (1849) 2 H
L Cases 309, 328; 9 ER 1109, 1117 per Lord Campbell.
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the general property in the goods.105 This means, as
Worthington pointed out in her classic analysis,
proprietary interests are ‘vitally important when the
defaulting party is insolvent; however, even outside
that context they remain a powerful coercive tool’.106
As Raczynska perceptively noted in her recent excellent
monograph, The Law of Tracing in Commercial
Transactions, an ROTC provides the seller with an
interest in the asset itself, and not in its value.107 It is
this important distinction which provides the seller
with the ability to control the asset;108 it can repossess
it should it be threatened by the buyer’s actions.109 It
may also attempt to follow through into dispositions
by the buyer (rather than being left with an interest in
any funds such a disposition realizes), though as will
be seen this is not an easy task.
There are further, more oblique, references to the
capacity of an ROTC to introduce conditions other
than those concerning repayment. Thus, in a footnote
to a statement that the seller will protect himself against
the buyer’s default by making property passing
conditional on payment, de Lacy puts it  beguilingly
simple: ‘Property may also be retained subject to the
buyer’s performance of  other conditions’.110 Most
recently, there is the following from the leading text
on personal property security:
Protecting its interests in the event of
the debtor’s insolvency is not the
creditor’s only possible motive for
taking security. From the creditor’s
point of  view, security, when allied to
enforcement rights often operative
without recourse to the courts, gives
the creditor the opportunity to take
speedy measures to abate future losses.
A secured creditor, moreover, is able to
control the affairs of the debtor at
critical moments and is equipped with
the means to monitor the affairs of
the debtor.111
It is accepted that immediately after the just-quoted
passage it is noted that ‘control and monitoring needs’
can be provided for by ‘detailed financial covenants,
coupled with rigorous events of default clauses’.112
105 Michael Bridge, Personal Property Law (4th edn, Clarendon
Press 2015) 169: it is ‘well settled’ that ROT sellers
‘retain the general property and not some unnamed
security’. See e.g. McEntire v Crossley [1895] AC 457.
106 Sarah Worthington, Proprietary Inter ests in Commercial
Transactions (Clarendon Press 1996) 2.
107 Magda Raczynska, The Law of Tracing in Commercial
Transactions (OUP 2018) 144: ‘Security interests and title-
based interests are proprietary interests asserted in assets,
not value, even though upon their enforcement, they
are realized through sale and realization of the current
market value’.
108 cf  Worthington (n 106) 2: ‘property is concerned with
control over access to the benefits of resources’.
109 In this sense the ROTC is more than a mere seller’s
lien, which is waived by implication in credit sales. For
an illustration of  the importance of  this capacity, see
e.g. Re Galway Concrete Ltd [1983] ILRM 402, 406 (Keane
J): ‘Its objects would be wholly frustrated if the owner
was not entitled to repossess the chattels in the event
of a default in payment on the party of the buyer or, at
the very least, in the event of a repudiation on the party
of the buyer of the agreement’, cited by Davies (n103)
78-79. See also John de Lacy, ‘The Evolution and
Regulation of Security Interests over Personal Property
in English Law’ in John de Lacy, The Reform of  UK Personal
Property Security Law (n 25) 5-7 (noting inter alia how it is
possible, if rare, for parties to protect themselves in
this way).
110 J de Lacy, ‘Romalpa theory and practice under retention
of title in the sale of goods’ (1995) 24 Anglo-American
Law Review 327, 349 fn 75. Others put it by means of
implication, often leading to some uncomfortable
assertions: Davies (n 103) 124: ‘The emphasis on property
reservation allows the owner to seize the property should
the debtor fail in one of his primary obligations, especially
the payment of the price. Essentially, the only commercial
purpose of property retention is to ensure priority: the
supplier is not retaining the asset himself but rather the
right to use the asset to gain payment of the debt to him’.
Here the first sentence (a repetition of that at 70) clearly
allows for the possibility of an obligation other than
price. The second sentence must thus be understood as
a normative claim and thus can be qualified. Instead of
‘the only commercial purpose’, it might be better to
have said the main commercial purpose. Other purposes,
of substantial commercial value, may exist.
111 Hugh Beale and others, The Law of Security and Title-Based
Financing (3rd edn, OUP 2018) [1.09]. Compare the
qualified language in other older texts, e.g. Henry Aitken,
The Principles of the Law of Sale of Goods (Edinburgh, E & S
Livingstone 1921) 61: ‘[The seller] desires to retain the
property until the price is paid or some other condition has
been performed by the buyer … The object of receiving the
right of disposal of the goods is generally to secure that
the price shall be paid before the property passes’
(emphasis added).
112 ibid.
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However, in line with the caveat noted at the outset of
this article,113 there is no claim here that the ROTC
approach is the only possibility. What is suggested is
simply that the ROTC approach may be used to
provide the necessary control to the supplier, such that
they can attempt to prevent waste plastics from being
disposed of by down-chain users so that they can
present their transactions as being circular economics
compliant. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the ROTC
approach might have some benefits compared to, say,
‘detailed financial covenants’ due to the simplicity of
the ROTC. Rather than having to ascertain (and
negotiate) the covenants, the ROTC offers a ‘ready-
made’ mechanism that enables the seller to maintain
that level of control necessary for circular economic
transactions; the ROTC provides a lower transaction-
cost mechanism.
There is however a noticeable lack of clarity as to the
extent of non-financial conditions that an ROTC
could introduce. The ROTC case-law is, perhaps
unsurprisingly, overwhelmingly concerned with
financial conditions. The lack of guidance requires the
development of an appropriate condition that may
be used as part of an ROTC in order to achieve the
type of  control that this article suggests is possible.
The condition could take this form: ‘In order to
comply with the principles of  circular economy, title to
all goods, including products of processes involving
such goods, will be retained by the owner until the
goods are transferred to an authorised third party for
the expressly agreed purpose of treating the goods as
a waste product for the purposes of  the Waste
Directive’. This example is merely illustrative, and the
possible variations will depend on a wide range of
factors. Different types of commercial situations will
of course require additional, or different, variations
on this. The preamble aspect, reflecting circular
economic principles, is something  of a flourish than
anything else (especially in the absence of any specific
legal formulations as to ‘principles of circular
economy’). Nevertheless, what it can provide is evidence
of contractual intention, in particular, an intention to
retain title for a purpose other than the common
understanding of ROTC as securing against buyer
insolvency per se. Doing so will be valuable in aiding
courts to see how the parties are trying to avoid the
pitfalls that can be created when parties attempt to
reach into the financial value of products (rather than
the objects themselves). Further evidence could be
specified by explicit reference not only to a power to
recapture, but by additional explanatory language
regarding the purpose of  such recapture (e.g. to prevent
surplus going to waste, or indeed to take surpluses as
waste, depending on the factual matrix).
Thus, we can see that ROTC can provide a mechanism
(though it is not the only possibility) for the
implementation of circular economic practices. The
seller can retain a title to plastics, and by doing so, they
retain the capacity to either direct the usage of the
goods or, in the event that the use or treatment of the
goods by down-chain parties is not in accordance with
the conditions of the initial ROT transaction, they can
recapture the goods. They have this power because
they have the legal title to the goods, and as such this
gives the ROT seller power to repossess the goods in
the event of breach of the ROTC (in contrast to mere
personal rights against the ROT buyer).114
Now it may well be that this title may be transferred by
virtue of an exception to the basic rule nemo dat quod
non habet;115 the ROT buyer may qualify as a buyer in
possession and thus their disponees may be able to
acquire a title to the goods by virtue of the Sale of
Goods Act 1979, section 25: buyer in possession
exception. Two issues arise from this.116 First, this
protection for sub-purchasers may not actually be
available in such cases. This is the consequence of the
reasoning in Re Highway Foods. There it was held that
113 See text following (n 23).
114 cf  Worthington (n 106) 16 noting that the buyer is in
control, in the sense that title will pass if the buyer pays
the price (or, for these purposes, does whatever
condition is required). But, as Worthington rightly notes
(at fn 50), the buyers ‘control’ is really a consequence
of the contractual provisions. These provisions are
likely to be determined by the seller: J R Bradgate,
‘Reservation of  Title Ten Years On’ [1987] Conv 434,
444.
115 Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 21.
116 There are other issues, discussed with clarity in
Raczynska, Law of Tracing (n107) 74-110.
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because the transactions were on ROT terms, there
was at best only an ‘agreement to sell’, and as such the
Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 25 buyer in possession
exception was not applicable.117 Second, even if the
Re Highways Food approach is incorrect,118 then it may
well be questioned whether or not the effect of the
ROTC is to take the transaction outside the scope of
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 altogether. This is the
possible implication of the decision in Bunkers, and
that is discussed further below.119 This article though
will put to one side the potential complications of the
English nemo dat law for circular economics, and will
consider instead the problems that are central to the
ROT transaction itself. Specifically, it needs to be
considered whether and to what extent the potential
control that comes from retained title can actually be
extended through to sub-disponees.
Until 1976, and the decision in Aluminium Industrie
Vaassen BV v Romalpa Aluminium,120 ‘the notion of
retention of title was in virtual abeyance’.121 In cases
following the (in)famous Romalpa decision,122 a
division between ‘simple’ and ‘extended’ ROTC arose.
Simple ROTC involves sellers retaining ownership of
goods supplied to one another. Such clauses operate
as functional security interests, but they are not formal
security interests (because they involve the retention
of title, rather than the grant of an interest).123 Because
ROTCs ‘have little practical utility if the goods have a
short commercial life’,124 parties have tried different
forms of extended ROTC: the basic type involves a
seller attempting to retain an interest in the supplied
product even after it has been through a manufacturing
process by the buyer.125 The danger with extended
ROTC is that they may be recharacterized as a charge,
granted by the buyer, and (invariably) void for want
of registration. This distinction between simple and
extended ROTC thus has an obvious impact on how
best to structure circular economic commercial
transactions involving plastics, especially the utilisation
of waste plastics as recyclates. Consider the following:
New plastics are created by Company A. Company A
has signed up to engage in CE practices, and the ROTC
it utilises attempts to introduce elements of CE
practices, specifically providing Company A with what
it believes to be an element of control down the chain
of transactions. By retaining title, it hopes to be able
to prevent plastics being used inappropriately (including
disposal as waste). Furthermore, it hopes to be able to
re-acquire the plastics for re-use in the event that their
disponees have surplus plastics. The clause is of the
nature set out above: ‘In order to comply with the
principles of  circular economy, title to all goods,
including products of processes involving such goods,
will be retained by Company A until the goods are
transferred to an authorised third party for the expressly
agreed purpose of treating the goods as a waste product
for the purposes of  the Waste Directive’.
Company A sells plastics on to Companies B, C and
D. Company B uses plastics directly with other goods
(in the manufacture of  widgets); C uses plastics directly,
117cf Louise Gullifer, ‘Exceptions to the nemo dat rule in
relation to goods and the Law Commission’s proposals
in the Consultative Report’ in John de Lacy, The Reform
of UK Personal Property Security Law (n 25) 188, 193: these
sort of cases are ‘theoretically covered’ by the Factors
Act 1889, section 9.
118 See Sean Thomas, ‘The Role of Authorization in Title
Conflicts Involving Retention of Title Clauses: Some
American Lessons’ (2014) 43 Common Law World
Review 29.
119 See text following n 215.
120 [1976] 1 WLR 676.
121 de Lacy, ‘Romalpa theory’ (n 110) 329.
122 Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228; Borden (UK) Ltd v
Scottish Timber Products Ltd [1981] Ch 25; Hendy Lennox
(Industrial Engines) Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd [1984] 1
WLR 485; Clough Mill Ltd v Martin [1985] 1 WLR 111
(CA); E Pfeiffer Weinkellerei-Weineinkauf  GmbH v Arbuthnot
Factors Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 150; Compaq Computer Ltd v
Abercorn Group Ltd [1991] BCC 484; Armour v Thyssen
Edelstahlwerke AG [1991] 2 AC 339.
123 McEntire v Crossley Brothers Ltd [1895] AC 457, 462 (Lord
Halsbury LC); Clough Mill v Martin [1985] 1 WLR 111,
120-121 (Robert Goff LJ); Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerek
AG [1991] 2 AC 339, 353 (Lord Keith), 354 (Lord Jauncey).
For comparison with the US position see Gerard
McCormack, Secured Credit under English and American Law
(CUP 2004) ch 6.
124 Beale and others (n 111) [1.23].
125 cf Gerard McCormack, Reservation of Title (2nd edn,
Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 2 (five types of ROTC: simple,
current account; extended; tracing; and aggregation).
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without other goods (in the manufacture of different
types of plastic); D uses plastics indirectly (as moulds
necessary for the production of doodads). Company
E is a plastics recycler, receiving surplus and waste
plastics from Companies A, B, C and D. Company E
sells the recycled plastics back to the four mentioned
companies, as well as to other third parties. At this
stage it should of course be noted that the
determination of each case will depend on the specific
nature of the particular clause,126 and the transaction
as a whole.127 The specific transactions will no doubt
each have substantial documentation, including that
relating to financing as well as other commercial issues.
However, it remains a sufficiently simple and precise
point to ask, to what extent can Company A control
the use of goods it has supplied using ROTC?
Conversely, to what extent is Company A able to rely
on the ROTC to keep the surplus and waste plastics
out of  Company E’s control?
The answer to these questions is depends on three
aspects of  ROTC law. First, there is the danger that
without careful framing of the retention of title, the
transaction may be characterised as a charge (and
inevitably void for non-registration). Second, the
transformation of the goods may be such that any
title that the seller had in the goods is lost in favour of
the buyer-manufacturer. Third, to what extent is it
possible for parties to actually agree between
themselves such that the title is retained by the seller
even though the buyer processes the goods? The main
focus here is on the second and third aspects. To
illustrate the problems, we can look at ICI New Zealand
v Agnew,128 a decision of  the New Zealand Court of
Appeal, on facts which are especially relevant to the
specific focus of this article,129 i.e., the capacity of
English law to provide mechanisms that enable circular
economic practices involving plastics to operate so as
to reduce wastage. ICI New Zealand v Agnew involved
plastic pellets that were transformed into containers; a
process that did not require additional materials but
only the ‘application of energy to the pellets, and the
use of expensive machinery’.130 The New Zealand
Court of Appeal held it ‘an unanswerable conclusion
that pellets which were used to produce the container
had lost their original identity – namely their identity
as pellets. It cannot matter that they can be reconverted
back to that identity, even assuming that could be a
practical exercise. The question requires a common-
sense answer’.131 The (allegedly) common-sense
answer was that the plastic contain was different to the
pellets. Thus, any attempt to use an ROTC to provide
control over the processed goods would be
unsuccessful.
Unfortunately, stating that this question ‘requires a
common-sense answer’ appeared to be the extent of
the reasoning: it appears the Court was persuaded by
counsel presenting them with a container, made of
the pellets, which was itself full of the pellets. This
appeared to be enough to convince the Court that the
pellets’ identity was lost; they were ‘completely different
in form’.132 This seemed to be the determinative
factor, as opposed to counsel’s suggestion that a
number of other factors should be accounted for,
namely the reversibility of the process, the lack of
admixture with other goods, the intention of the
parties, and the ‘limited extent of the change in physical
appearance’.133
This decision thus stands headfast against any attempts
to develop a circular economics approach to plastics,
where such an approach relies on the retention of
ownership in the seller-initiator of the circular
economic transaction and that the seller-initiator can
use this retained ownership right in order to control
the use of the plastics down a chain of transactions,
so as to prevent wastage and/or to recapture surpluses.
It will be seen in the remainder of this sub-section
that it is possible to argue that changes in goods
126 Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228; Beale and others (n
111) [4.22].
127 Agnew v Commission of Inland Revenue [2001] AC 710; Helby
v Matthews [1895] AC 471; Beale and others (n 111) [4.21].
128 [1998] 2 NZLR 129.
129 It is worth noting that this case is not mentioned at any
point in Raczynska (n 107).
130 [1998] 2 NZLR 129, 130 (Henry J).
131 ibid 135 (Henry J).
132 ibid 134-135 (Henry J).
133 ibid 134.
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wrought by a manufacturing process might not lead
to a loss of  title. Specifically, it will be suggested that
the decision in ICI New Zealand v Agnew should not be
followed rigidly, thus opening a space for plastics
suppliers to use ROTCs to cover the products of
plastics reprocessing.
The balance between the material effects (i.e. the change
to the original goods in the manufacturing process)
and the contractual agreement ‘is not entirely
settled’,134 and the key test seems to be whether the
original goods have ‘lost their identity’.135 This makes
it sometimes difficult to draw the line between [cases
where goods have lost their identity] and those (few)
cases … where the goods have ‘merely’ been processed
and have not lost their identity. No clear principle has
yet emerged from the cases, which merely assert that
the original goods have (or have not) ‘lost their
identity’ and/or have been ‘transformed’ into a ‘new
product’ … Nevertheless, it has been suggested that,
contractual provisions apart, whether the supplier’s
title is lost or retained in the product should depend
on ‘economic realities’ and ‘issues such as whether
reversing the process is economically realistic, and
whether the goods have increased in value to make
them a qualitatively different thing’. A cursory survey
of  the cases certainly suggests that if  the processing
increases the value of  the original goods significantly,
then the supplier’s title is lost and this accords with an
understandable reluctance to confer a ‘windfall’ on the
supplier by holding that the more valuable products
are still his.136
This extensive quotation is necessary to demonstrate
the lack of  clarity on the law.137 There are divergent
views on this matter. Benjamin’s Sale of  Goods goes
slightly further in cautiously accepting the potential
effect of party intention, as well as acknowledging that
numerous factors may play a role in the
determination.138 Davies implicitly indicates that the
specific agreement may be determinative,139 and
Worthington takes a similar view.140 De Lacy has
strongly argued that if goods supplied are subjected
to a process that can be reversed without material
damage, then an ROTC will be effective to allow the
seller to recover the property on the buyer’s default.141
Furthermore he argued that, ‘It is clear from the
reasoning [in Clough Mill] that there was no legal
principle preventing effect being given to a stipulation
that title to manufactured products vested with the
supplier … it remains open to the parties to expressly
cater for the buyer’s input into the finished product’.142
On the other hand, Raczynska argues that whilst there
may be considerable freedom of contract, it is not an
‘absolute’ freedom and ‘must be accommodated within
138 M G Bridge (gen ed), Benjamin’s Sale of  Goods (10th edn
Sweet & Maxwell 2017) (Benjamin) [5.151]: ‘the question
whether or not goods which are still identifiable, but
have to a greater or less extent been worked on by the
buyer or incorporated in other articles, remain the
property of the seller would seem to depend upon
what intention is to be imputed to the parties, having
regard to such factors as the nature of the goods, the
product, the degree and purpose of incorporation, and
the manufacturing or other process applied’.
139 Davies (n 103) 32: ‘There is no doubt that the approach
taken by the Court of Appeal in Clough Mill and the
House of Lords in Armour restores the lustre of
retention of title clauses to suppliers of goods. One
reason for this is that great emphasis was placed upon
the agreement between the two parties as determining
the issues. …Although it was not really at issue in Clough
Mill, both Robert Goff and Oliver LJJ held at common
law property in new goods made by material supplied
could vest in the supplier so long as there was an
agreement to this effect’.
140 Worthington (n 106) 14: it is possible, though not
probable, and the necessary intention needs clear
manifestation. See also, at 142, fn 128: the rules on
specification are only relevant in the absence of contrary
contractual agreement as to the location of title in
manufactured products. It is also worth pointing out
that Worthington also correctly noted (at 32) that windfall
arguments against the seller having rights in products
‘ought to be irrelevant’.
141 de Lacy, ‘Romalpa theory’ (n 110) 351.
142 de Lacy, ‘Romalpa theory’ (n 110) 355-356.
134 Citing Clough Mill Ltd v Martin [1985] 1 WLR 111, noted
above (n 175).
135 Beale and others (n 111) [7.13].
136 ibid [7.15]. The suggestion about ‘economic realities’ is
supported (at fn 105) by reference to Duncan Webb,
‘Title and Transformation: Who Owns Manufactured
Goods?’ [2000] JBL 513, 540.
137 See also McCormack, Reservation of Title (n 125) ch 3, and
122-127.
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the existing legal framework which contains various
limits’ especially concerning property distribution
rules.143 Webb, whose work appears particularly
influential,144 goes even further in reifying rules of
property over party intention. He argued that although
‘courts have taken the view that there is no conceptual
bar to such a contractual clause having the effect
contended’, ‘such an approach is artificial and results
in considerable inconsistencies’;145 ‘inconsistencies
in[…] the relationship between the law of contract
and property which are unacceptable’.146 The
‘traditional analysis that any title in new goods must
necessarily be acquired from the manufacturer, as that
is where the title as a matter of law resides’ has ‘the
advantage of  simplicity. It requires no reformulation
or addition to existing rules of  law. It is consistent
with and follows from the basic premises of property
law’.147
Two responses can be made to this claim. First, it rests
on the idea that property rules should not be
susceptible to contractual manipulation. The problem
here is that Webb’s approach to this idea is rather
absolutist, yet such a claim cannot be seriously held as
applying without exception. Contractual agreements
can and do have the effect of altering proprietary rights
and interests; indeed contracts are one of the few ways
by which we can voluntarily alter proprietary rights.
Why should they not have such an effect in cases
involving the production of goods? Furthermore,
adherence to this absolute priority of property over
contract has the effect of trying to do too much. It is
not the purpose of this article to argue that there
should not be any possibility of property rules
providing the structure for transactions and that
everything should simply be a riot of  contracting.
Instead, it is merely suggested that at the edges of  the
doctrine’s application the strictness of  Webb’s approach
starts to break down. This is arguably alluded to by
Raczynska, who concludes her chapter on loss of
proprietary interest in an asset by stating that ‘[n]one
of the events discussed here allow the parties to
prevent the loss of proprietary interest by a stipulation
in contract, although in a number of events there is
flexibility for parties to provide for a proprietary
response after the event, for example in the case of
manufacture’.148 This is typical of the general tenor
of the literature, which is an accurate reflection of the
case-law; a position Webb essentially dismisses with
the claim that property rules must always defeat
contractual agreement. The point is simple: the courts
have accepted that in principle parties can contractually
agree as to the location of proprietary interests post-
manufacture.149 Webb claimed that the fact that courts
have ‘invariably strained to prevent such clauses from
operating by placing impossibly high requirements on
them, thereby preventing the parties from
implementing their contractual intentions’, indicates
the practical unworkability of such clauses.150
However, it is suggested that this should be turned
on its head. A better reading of the cases is that courts
are trying to point out what needs to be done by
contracting parties: the requirements imposed are not
‘impossibly high’.151
The second response to Webb’s approach is
fundamentally a policy-driven argument. Webb
suggests that favouring the contractual approach
would generate practical problems. Thus, he states that
a manufacturer could argue that it vests its goods
directly in its customers: this would mean there would
not be a sale.152 It should be recognised that this is
actually a policy argument, not a practical one. The
policy that Webb is arguing for is that manufacturers
should not be allowed to argue that they have not
143 Raczynska (n107) 204.
144 Webb (n 136). As to its influence see Beale and others
(n 111) [7.16] fn 113.
145 Webb (n 136) 514.
146 ibid 531.
147 ibid 532.
148 Raczynska (n 107) 112. See also at 179: An ROTC ‘could
be interpreted as a contract whereby the parties intend
that the seller becomes the owner of the products
manufactured … there is nothing that prevents the
contributors to the joinder from agreeing to depart
from the default rule … Whether the agreement departs
from the default rule, and the extent to which it does,
is a matter of construction of contract’.
149 cf Raczynska (n 107) 180, noting how this approach
‘allows greater respect for freedom of contract’.
150 ibid 539.
151 cf  Worthington (n 106) 32: it is theoretically possible.
152 ibid 536-537.
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sold their goods. However, in light of the policy
underlying circular economics, this needs to be
rethought. That the absence of a sale is inherently
within the conceptual structure of circular economic
practices, which rests solidly on the idea that there will
merely be contracted-use as opposed to any transfer
of  property, should be clear. It may well be that there
is something intrinsically revolutionary about the idea
that a contractual agreement can operate to vest title in
a supplier rather than a manufacturer. However, radical,
if  not outright revolutionary, thinking will be needed
to deal with plastics in circular economics. If it is the
case (and it is acknowledged that the following is
inherently controversial for any lawyer, including this
writer) that circular economics will require a move away
from an ownership-central economy to one that rests
on contracted-use, a system where product-as-service
is the governing reality, then something will have to
give in the face of the practical commercial reality that
such new forms of goods-transactions will become
dominant.153 What could and perhaps should give is
the idea that ownership rights to inputs must
necessarily be extinguished at each instance of a
manufacturing step. There is no clear way by which
suppliers of plastics will be able to control the use of
the plastics if every time the plastics are modified into
a different form, the original title is extinguished: this
is clear from the decision in ICI New Zealand v Agnew.154
To continue with this approach is to necessarily accept
that the manufacturing process is linear, one of creation
and destruction. Therefore, something different is
needed.
Policy arguments can be adduced to justify,
normatively, a change in our approach. Furthermore,
such a change is arguably not as doctrinally impossible
as Webb suggests. What follows is a closer examination
of the doctrine than that usually found in the literature,
in the sense that it focuses directly and specifically on
the capacity to extend into products, but not for the
purpose of  protecting against insolvency. In simple
terms, we are at this point looking to see whether it is
possible in English law.
In re Bond Worth involved an attempt to use a ROTC
to maintain an interest in yarn being used in carpet
production.155 The seller, Monsanto, had failed to
provide any restriction on Bond Worth dealing with
the yarn; the ROTC was essentially meaningless ‘so
long as Bond Worth remained apparently good for
the money’.156 Monsanto argued that they had
retained ‘equitable and beneficial ownership’, but Slade
J said that the particular terms were such that ‘the
proper manner of construing the retention of title
clause, together with all the other relevant provisions
of the contracts of sale read as a whole, is to regard
them as effecting a sale in which the entire property in
the Acrilan passes to Bond Worth followed by a
security, eo instanti, given back by Bond Worth to the
vendor, Monsanto’.157
In Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products Ltd, the
claimant’s title to the resin ceased when the resin was
irretrievably incorporated with woodchips during the
manufacture of chipboard.158 Bridge LJ concluded
that:
[i]f a seller of goods to a manufacturer,
who knows that his goods are to be
used in the manufacturing process
153 There is a vast literature on the role of policy in (private)
law; here only two indicative references will be made.
First, Bradgate, ‘Reservation of  Title Ten Years On’ (n
114) 443-444: ‘academic quibbles should not prevent
the law responding to changing commercial practices
in a commercially and socially desirable way’. Second,
Karl N Llewellyn, Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales
(Callaghan 1930) 568: implicitly noting the contradiction
between (i) ‘fairness in court can be achieved only by
taking the policy considerations of the case into
consideration’ and (ii) ‘[c]onsiderations of policy –
especially any single writer’s views on policy – is no
substitute for the positive law’. The point here is simply
that we cannot dismiss arguments of policy on the
basis that they are arguments of  policy, nor should we
avoid the issue by dressing up arguments of policy as
something else.
154 [1998] 2 NZLR 129.
155 [1980] Ch 228.
156 ibid 244.
157 ibid 256.
158 Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products Ltd [1981] Ch 25,
44 (Templeman LJ): ‘When the resin was incorporated
in the chipboard, the resin ceased to exist, the plaintiffs’
title to the resin became meaningless and their security
vanished’.
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before they are paid for, wishes to
reserve to himself  an effective security
for the payment of the price, he cannot
rely on a simple reservation of  title
clause such as that relied upon by the
plaintiffs. If he wishes to acquire rights
over the finished product, he can only
do so by express contractual
stipulation. We have seen an elaborate,
and presumably effective example of
such a stipulation in [Romalpa]. An
attempt to acquire rights over the
finished product by a stipulation which
proved ineffective for want of
registration … is to be seen in [In re
Bond Worth].159
The clear implication is that ‘express contractual
stipulation’ would suffice to extend control over
processed products. Three years later came Re
Peachdart,160 where Vinelott J held it ‘impossible to
suppose that … the parties intended’ for the seller to
have the right to take leather that had partly or
completely been produced into handbags.161 This was
partly because there was no condition in the sale
agreement that records of each manufactured handbag
be kept, nor was there any other evidence that the
parties even contemplated this possibility.162 Vinelott
J also accounted for the alteration in the values of the
raw materials, with a tipping point occurring when the
leather lost its value as a raw material due to it being
worked on.163 He further held that the contract drafter
had failed to delineate between a sale on ROT terms
and the generation of a charge.164
The Court of Appeal in Clough Mill Ltd v Martin
would deal with ROTC over yarn used in fabric
manufacturing.165 Robert Goff  LJ was willing to
follow Vinelott J’s judgment in Re Peachdart,166 and
was of  the opinion that whilst in cases where A’s goods
are used by B to create new goods, the ‘property in the
new goods will generally vest in B, at least where the
goods are not reducible to the original materials’.167
This ‘generally’ bears some weight, as Robert Goff LJ
immediately implied: ‘it is difficult to see why, if  the
parties agree that the property in the goods shall vest
in A, that agreement should not be given effect to’.168
What is interesting is how in the literature this position
appears to have been flipped. Whilst Robert Goff LJ
noted the difficulty of seeing why the agreement
should not be given effect, commentators have tended
to talk of the difficulty of seeing why the agreement
should be effected.169 Yet it must be accepted that a
properly-drafted ROTC could provide for such an
event;170 what seems necessary is a way to account for
the possibility that the buyer may have
paid part of the price for the material,
but also that he will have borne the
cost of manufacture of the new goods,
and may also have provided other
materials for incorporation into those
goods; and the condition is silent, not
only about repaying such part of the
price for the material as has already been
paid by the buyer, but also about any
allowance to be made by the plaintiff
to the buyer for the cost of manufacture
of the new goods, or for any other
material incorporated by the buyer into
the new goods.171
Robert Goff LJ thus found it
impossible to believe that it was the
intention of the parties that the
plaintiff would thereby gain the
159 ibid 42.
160 Re Peachdart Ltd [1984] Ch 131.
161 ibid 142.
162 ibid.
163 ibid 142-143.
164 ibid 143.
165 Clough Mill Ltd v Martin [1985] 1 WLR 111.
166 ibid 120.
167 ibid 119, citing Bl Comm (17th ed 1830) vol 2, 404-405.
168 Clough Mill Ltd v Martin [1985] 1 WLR 111, 119.
169 See eg Raczynska (n 107) 179: ‘Courts are very unlikely
to find that, as a matter of construction of the parties’
agreement, parties intended that the seller should have
ownership of the product’.
170 As implied in Davies (n103) 32, 70.
171 ibid 120.
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windfall of the full value of the new
product, deriving as it may well do not
merely from the labour of the buyer
but also from materials that were the
buyer’s without any duty to account to
the buyer for any surplus of the
proceeds of sale above the outstanding
balance of the price due by the buyer to
the plaintiff.172
Yet Oliver LJ also noted that the case itself  did not
actually concern the problems of manufacturing,173
and thus Robert Goff  LJ’s comments can only really
have been obiter. This means that the actual specifics
of the content of a ROTC which effectively reaches
into products are not necessarily those set out by Robert
Goff  LJ. Coming back to the point of  principle, it was
clear that while Oliver LJ appeared to accept that the
production of a new thing would mean that any
attempt to retain title was futile,174 this was not an
absolute rule:
English law has developed no very
sophisticated system for determining
title in cases where indistinguishable
goods are mixed or become combined
in a newly manufactured article and, to
adopt the words of Lord Moulton in
Sandeman & Sons v Tyzack & Branfoot
Steamship Co. [1913] A.C. 680 , 695, ‘the
whole matter is far from being within
the domain of settled law’; and though,
like Sir John Donaldson MR, I prefer
to reserve my opinion, I am not sure
that I see any reason in principle why
the original legal title in a newly
manufactured article composed of
materials belonging to A and B. should
not lie where A and B. have agreed that
it shall lie.175
Later cases have adopted the same approach. Modelboard
Ltd v Outer Box Ltd might appear to be of particular
interest as there the contract provided that the buyer
was ‘licensed … to process the goods’ and that the
products should be marked as being made with the
contracted goods, and admixtures were to be
considered the seller’s ‘sole and exclusive property’.176
Unfortunately though, the implications of this license
were not considered – later in this article it will be
considered whether the use of licenses as a means to
resolve the problems arising in the ROTC context may
work.177 Coming back to the specific decision, Michael
Hart QC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, could
‘see no reason why the plaintiff should not retain
property in the board so far as it remained identifiable
notwithstanding its having had value added to it by
the plaintiff ’s labour and materials, if  that is what the
contract on its true construction provides’.178 The
earlier focus on the relevance of value added by third
parties seems potentially blurred in light of the policy
of upholding a commercially common sense
construction of what the contracting parties agreed.
Thus, in Ian Chisholm Textiles v Griffiths, where the
claimant supplier of cloth argued for title in
manufactured cloth products, David Neuberger QC
held that:
172 ibid 120. Sir John Donaldson MR was (at 125) ‘[s]o far as
is material in deciding this appeal … in complete
agreement with the judgment of Robert Goff L.J’. He
did however allude to a multi-stage test for situations
like this (though notably he said ‘they are not the
circumstances which exist in the instant appeal’). It is
only if there needs to be assessment of whether or not
there is a new product (consisting of the goods
concerned and other material), that we need to
‘determine who owned the product’. Once there has
been such a determination, we can work out whether
the owner is the seller or the buyer. If it is the buyer,
then as a matter of law there is a charge. However, he
failed to set out how this process of determining who
owned the product is to be undertaken (as Oliver LJ
said, at 124, on the uncertain issue of ‘determining title
in cases [of mixtures and new articles], ‘like Sir John
Donaldson MR, I prefer to reserve my opinion’), and it
is not clear from the Master of  the Roll’s analysis whether
this is a matter of law (in the sense of it being a
necessary consequence of the mixing of the goods
that it is the buyer who is the owner), or dependant on
party intention (as suggested above, the Master of the
Rolls’ agreement with Robert Goff  LJ’s analysis implies
the latter).
173 ibid 121.
174 ibid 123.
175 ibid 124.
176 Modelboard Ltd v Outer Box Ltd [1992] BCC 945, 948 (Michael
Hart QC).
177 Text following (n 228).
178 ibid 952.
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While the rights of the parties under a
retention of title agreement, just as
under any other agreement, must
depend upon the proper construction
of the agreement concerned, it seems
to me that there must be a strong
presumption, essentially based on
commercial common sense, to the effect
that, in the absence of very clear words,
the parties would not have intended
[that title in the manufactured product
remaining with the plaintiff].179
Notably though he went on to state that ‘I do not
read [Clough Mill and Re Peachdart] as laying down as a
matter of law that the construction for which the
plaintiff contends is impossible … [and that if the
supplier is to not only retain title to his supplied goods
but to obtain title to the manufactured product] very
clear words must be used’.180 It thus seems that the
contractual specifics are still of considerable, and
potentially determinative, force in ascertaining the
rights in such cases; just not in this case.181 Like in the
earlier cases though, David Neuberger QC found it ‘a
little difficult’ to see how the goods other than those
supplied by the claimant which formed part of the
manufactured product could be transferred to the
claimant, because whilst ‘the extra items would not be
of great value’, there was ‘added value’ coming from
the defendants ‘design and workmanship and other
treatment’.182
Two points should be noted here. First, the important
extra ‘value’ is not in the financial value of the goods,
but in the more inchoate value of the work done to
the goods. Second, these cases involve combinations
of supplied goods and other goods of a different
nature resulting in the manufactured product. This
could have an impact on how the first point is really
understood. It is thus not that there is extra work
done on the goods, but rather, the added value comes
from the work done in combining different types of
goods.183 This can perhaps be contrasted with the
situation that might arise in the context of plastics
waste recyclates. In such cases, the goods concerned are
much closer in their inherent nature. The effect of this
can be observed in considering cases where the goods
concerned were worked on, but were not combined
with goods of different types. Thus a distinction could
be drawn between situations where goods were simply
attached, in a reversible manner, to other goods,184 or
where goods were merely physically reshaped in such a
way that they ‘retain their essential identity’,185 and
situations where the ‘original goods “lose their
identity” and are used to create a new product’.186
A brief  note at this stage can be made to Chaigley Farms
Ltd v Crawford, Kaye & Grayshire Ltd.187 There the goods
were live animals, which were then slaughtered.
Counsel had followed the reference to Bracton and
Blackstone, via Crossley Vaines,188 in Hendy Lennox,189
and argued that the issue was whether the goods were
turned into a different ‘species’.190 Thus grapes turning
into wine would result in a loss of title (to the grapes),
but a picked grape has not so turned into a different
‘species’; consequently a slaughtered animal remains
179 Ian Chisholm Textiles v Griffiths [1994] BCC 96 (ChD) 101.
180 ibid 102.
181 ibid 104: ‘In the instant case, there is simply no provision
in the agreement dealing with the rights of the parties
once the cloth is incorporated in an article with other
goods’.
182 ibid 102-103.
183 As the quoted sentence in n 181181 implies: ‘once the
cloth is incorporated in an article with other goods’
(emphasis added).
184 Such as engines with identifying marks (serial numbers):
Hendy Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd v Grahame Puttick
Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 485, 494 (Staughton J).
185 Such as cutting metal into sheets: Armour v Thyssen
Edelstahlwerke AG [1991] 2 AC 339; or wood to logs: New
Zealand Forest Products Ltd v Pongakawa Sawmill Ltd [1992]
3 NZLR 304.
186 Beale and others (n 111) [7.13].
187 [1996] BCC 957.
188 E L G Tyler and N Palmer, Crossley Vaines on Personal
Property (5th edn Butterworth 1973) 430.
189 Hendy Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd v Grahame Puttick
Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 485, 494 (Staughton J): ‘According to
Bracton and Blackstone when a thing is changed into a
different species, as by making wine, oil, bread or malt
out of the grapes, olives, wheat or barley of another,
the operator becomes the new owner thereof and is
only liable (in damages) to the former proprietor for
the value of the materials he has so converted’.
190 [1996] BCC 957, 961-962.
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of the same ‘species’. However, Garland J said there
was ‘an inescapable difference between a live animal
and a dead one, particularly a dead one minus hide or
skin, offal, blood, bone, hoof horn and other parts
not sold on as butchers’ meat’.191 What this case
indicates though is not that there cannot be a case
where there is no maintenance of the disputed goods
as being of the same ‘species’, such that a ROTC can
continue into products; rather, if there is such a
situation then it will require special facts (and this case
did not because the slaughter of animals did alter their
‘species’) and in particular a very precise contractual
agreement to maintain the ROTC into the product.192
This loss of identity test would appear to cover the
case of  plastics: ICI New Zealand v Agnew.193 However,
in light of the preceding analysis, it is very difficult to
square the decision in ICI New Zealand v Agnew with
those cases which had held that a change in form (even
an irreversible change in form194) would not necessarily
lead to a loss of  identity. Furthermore, those cases
which do illustrate a loss of identity involve either an
irreversible change or an admixture. To be convinced
by the fact that the product concerned can contain
examples of the supplied goods, where the goods
concerned are by their very name as plastic a type of
material that can be formed and, importantly, reformed,
is almost a perverse misunderstanding of  the nature
of  the goods, i.e. plastics. To this it may be countered
that the expense or limited technical feasibility of the
reversal process may be enough to justify this
distinction between supplies and products, on the
grounds that in cases involving a manufacturing
process have emphasised the addition of value
through such a process.195 Yet such an approach fails
to account for the distinction in the process of reversion
both in terms of feasibility (compare the technical
difficulty of reverting plastic products back to plastic
supplies, with the technical impossibility of reverting
meat back to cattle, or wine to grapes), and in terms of
inherent qualities of the material concerned – some
plastics at least are specifically made in order to be
reversionable.196
In conclusion, parties can, if they frame their
agreements with sufficient precision and clarity, extend
an ROTC claim into products. The fact that there is
limited evidence of successful contracting of this nature
must be considered just to be a consequence of
insufficient drafting clarity rather than an issue of
191 ibid 963.
192 cf  Re Weddel (NZ) Ltd (1996) 5 NZBLC 104, 055 (New
Zealand High Court), noted John de Lacy, ‘Retention
of Title and Claims Against Processed Goods: A
Different Approach’ (1997) 13(5) Tolley’s Insolvency
Law and Practice 163. The New Zealand High Court
held that the supplier of live animals could assert title
to the products of slaughter. In following New Zealand
Forest Products Ltd v Pongakawa Sawmill Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR
304, Gallen J said there process of slaughter had not
changed the nature of the stock, which had not lost its
identity. For de Lacy, this decision shows ‘a fundamental
difference in approach’ between English and New
Zealand courts, and that ‘in New Zealand any
manufacturing process that does not involve the
addition of extraneous material to the end product
will not cause title to be transferred from seller to
buyer. The labour, industry and associated costs
necessary to bring about the manufacturing or other
process are, apparently, to be disregarded in deciding
the question of the location of title’. In this regard de
Lacy suggests that ‘the key to reconciling this divergence
of approach is an understanding of the economic, social
and geographic policy divides which have emerged
over time between the two jurisdictions and are now
beginning to manifest in their respective common laws’.
193 [1998] 2 NZLR 129.
194 New Zealand Forest Products Ltd v Pongakawa Sawmill Ltd
[1992] 3 NZLR 304, 309 (Richardson J): ‘goods worked
on retain their identity must depend on the nature and
extent of the work permitted to be done and actually
done … Here the goods supplied were logs; they were
sawn to provide sawn timber … There is no suggestion
that the processing was extensive or expensive…
Importantly the processing simply modified the form
of the logs which as sawn timber retained its essential
character. In that regard we cannot discern any significant
difference between the timber in this case and the
steel in Armour v Thyssen’.
195 See eg Modelboard Ltd v Outer Box Ltd [1992] BCC 945,
952, noted at n 178.
196 The fact that some plastics cannot be reformed is
neither here nor there as to the general point. As to the
potential for plastics recycling under current and
potential future technical feasibility, see generally
Rethinking the Future of Plastics (n 60).
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principle.197 The problem in ICI New Zealand v Agnew,
for example, is that the seller’s terms were of  general
application for the sale of all types of goods
(imprecision as to the specific assets).198 On the other
hand, claims to ‘equitable and beneficial ownership’,
such as in In re Bond Worth, are insufficient, because the
extent of such a claim is unclear and imprecise (as to
the nature of the claim). It is also strongly arguable
that whilst giving any authority to sub-sell the goods
will itself explode any competing term attempting to
retain ownership past that point, this is also just the
impact of imprecise contracting (imprecise due to
contradiction). Thus, it can be suggested that there is
no inherent difficulty with the possibility of a seller
extending into manufactured products, especially
where there are no other goods involved in the
manufacture. The test depends on the content of the
agreement between seller and buyer.
Having identified at least some of the seemingly more
secure boundaries limiting the extent of an ROTC, it
is now possible to ascertain what an acceptable ROTC
which extends into products might look like. Earlier it
was noted that an ROTC will need to prevent
dispositions unless of a specific authorised nature,
but that formulating anything more specific will
depend on the particular factual matrix of the
transaction.199 This makes it essential to recognise that
the best example here will necessarily be rather vaguer
than those which practical application might generate.
Using the example ROTC from ICI New Zealand v
Agnew, we can see that ownership would remain with
the seller if the goods retained their identity (clause
10.1). If there was a change (though it has been argued
above that this was not that case there), then the clause
pertaining to such events (clause 10.2) rested on the
financial relationship between the parties. If as
suggested above, there is nothing preventing an ROTC
from being created without reference to the financial
aspect, then it is possible to sidestep the difficulties
raised by attempting to ascertain the pro-rata (or
otherwise) relationship between the buyer’s debt and
the processed goods. There are other factors though
that Henry J identified as demonstrating that clause
10.2 actually created a charge. It is suggested that
changes to these factors, through explicit contractual
language, would create an ROTC that would enable
control of the goods. Henry J stated that, in addition
to the (now sidestepped issue of indebtedness),
‘[s]eparate, and thereafter continuing, identification
would be required’, but for him, ‘such an exercise was
obviously never intended and would also be quite
unworkable’.200 Moreover, as a practical aspect,
enhanced tracking of goods is essential to achieving
the overarching aims of circular economics,201 even if
it does remain somewhat technologically
challenging.202 Nevertheless, it is possible that progress
will be made,203 and combined these changes in the
broader commercial context suggest that parties
explicitly engaged in circular economic practices would
explicitly intend for separate and continuing
197 See eg ICI New Zealand v Agnew [1998] 2 NZLR 129, 135:
‘we accept as a matter of principle that in some
circumstances contracting parties can effectively agree
that legal title to a manufactured article can vest in one
of them when the article comes into existence’.
198 [1998] 2 NZLR 129, 134 (Henry J). Cf Beale and others
(n 111) [7.17] fn 122: ‘the judge regarded the issue as one
of construction of the contract, leaving open the
possibility that it is possible for a supplier to acquire
title to the product otherwise than by way of charge’.
The phraseology used possibly shows an unconscious
denial of the possibility that title to products could be
detained. It should be clear that the supplier is retaining
title, not acquiring title: this subtle and revealing shift
has the effect of incorrectly flipping the argument, in
a way that clearly does unacceptable violence to the
agreement of the parties concerned; unacceptable
because it is a clear contradiction not only to the
agreement in and of itself but also because it substitutes
the suppliers actual argument (for retention of that
which was originally theirs) to something quite different
(for acquisition of something that was not originally
theirs).
199 See text following (n 113).
200 [1998] 2 NZLR 129, 135.
201 See eg EC (n 10) 11: policy recommendation to set up
a ‘coordination mechanism, combining technical,
commercial and behavioural expertise, for tracking
material flows and renewable feedstock inventories,
and for strategic long-term investments in plastics
production,
  collection, sorting and recycling infrastructure across
Europe’.
202 EC (n 10) 104-105.
203 See eg EC (n 10) 109, recommending funding to develop
tracking technologies.
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identification of goods within a circular economic
transactional structure.
Furthermore, Henry J stated that the ROTC had ‘no
prohibition against incorporating other materials into
a manufacturing process’.204 Thus a circular economic-
compliant ROTC would have such a prohibition.
Processes which utilise other goods will need to be
accounted for though. It is not entirely clear what the
best way forward may be in such situations. It is
possible for parties to agree to a joint ownership
though,205 so there would be nothing in principle
against an ROTC that explicitly outlines a potential
joint ownership situation in such an event. It may
however not be possible to avoid a third party refusing
to enter such an agreement, and it must be considered
that that would be outside the boundaries of a circular
economic transaction; whilst going so far a ROTC
cannot operate to enforce a particular commercial policy
on third parties contrary to their intention. Indeed
this serves to emphasise the aim of  this article, which
is merely to demonstrate how parties that wish to
enter into a circular economic-compliant transaction
may be able to construct an appropriate agreement
(i.e. one which will not be recharacterized as a charge,
and one which provides the appropriate capacity for a
party to control goods down a chain of transactions).
It has been demonstrated that ROTC can provide a
level of control which may be useful for plastics
manufacturers (and indeed other commercial actors),
to prevent goods being used in a manner incompatible
with circular economics. This level of control could
even extend into the products of  processing. The
nature of plastics recycling is such that the danger of
mixing different types of goods, in terms of
preventing ownership from being extended, becomes
less relevant. Furthermore, there is the possibility of
developing ROTC that do not concern the financial
aspects of the transactions. That is, it is possible to
sell goods on ROT terms, where such terms concern
other conditions. This would be a small measure to
enhance the capacity of parties to engage in circular
economics. As was noted earlier, the recent Waste
Strategy suggested, though without any substantive
detail, possible use of ‘regulatory or economic
instruments if necessary and appropriate’ to deal with
the problems of  waste generation and recycling.206
Recognising that English ROTC doctrine can possibly
be used, as such an ‘instrument’, to achieve the policy
aims of circular economics, requires acknowledgment
that the law can go beyond the mere aim of dealing
with (the threat of) insolvency. Should commercial
actors wish to extend control, to prevent waste and to
enable more effective recapture for the purposes of
recycling, they have the capacity if they are willing to
decouple the financial aspects from the property-control
aspects of the transaction in an explicit manner. At
this point it becomes necessary to consider the potential
implications of the recent Bunkers decision.
3.1.1 Bunkers
In 2016, the Supreme Court engaged with the very
foundations of understanding of ROTC, in PST
Energy 7 Shipping LLC v O W Bunker Malta Limited
(commonly known as the Bunkers case).207 Lord
Mance, giving the judgment of the Court, held that
the effect of an ROTC combined with ‘a feature quite
different from a contract of sale of goods - the liberty
to consume all or any part of the bunkers supplied
without acquiring property in them or having paid for
them’,208 took the transaction concerned outside the
Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SGA) regime. Instead we
now have a ‘third way’; a sale that is not a sale for the
purposes of the SGA. For want of a more
taxonomically elegant conceptualisation, this novel
form of transaction has garnered the moniker of a sui
generis sale.209
204 [1998] 2 NZLR 129, 135.
205 See eg Coleman v Harvey [1989] 1 NZLR 723, where the
New Zealand Court of Appeal held that a mixture of
silver was to be co-owned. This case was not cited in
ICI New Zealand v Agnew.
206 See above text accompanying (n 78).
207 [2016] UKSC 23. It is also sometimes called Res Cogitans,
after the ship involved.
208 Bunkers [2016] AC 1034 [34].
209 cf Raczynska (n 107) 15: ‘they may be sui generis contracts
with retention-of-title for the supply of goods with
licence (authority) to sub-sell or to manufacture or, in
other words, a licence (authority) to destroy the seller’s
proprietary interest’.
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Bunkers has received numerous critical responses.
Gullifer has questioned whether or not the whole
structure of sales and retention of title needs to be
rebuilt.210 For her, Bunkers has the effect of effectively
neutering SGA s 49,211 showing ‘the lack of ‘fit’
between the SGA and the use of ROT clauses’.212
Saidov described Bunkers as potentially a ‘wrong
turning’ which may ‘reduce the scope and significance
of the sale of goods law’.213 Low and Loi are even
more biting in their criticism: ‘the Supreme Court has
plunged English law and commerce into a state of
Carrollian irrationality’.214
Certainly, a number of  issues remain unclear following
Bunkers. Most obviously, there are doubts about the
nature of  the sui generis sale: Lord Mance suggested
that such contracts ‘would contain similar implied
terms as to description, quality, etc to those implied in
any conventional sale’,215 but which statutory terms
would necessarily be implied into such transactions
remains unclear.216 Little can really be said here about
specific implications for plastics waste transactions.
Whilst questions about the appropriateness of the
terms concerning description, quality and fitness for
purpose (for instance) are live and would be highly
relevant to plastics waste transactions, they would also
be relevant to any sui generis sale not just those
concerning plastics waste.
Will Bunkers apply in all cases where goods are supplied
for the purposes of consumption? This question is
not entirely clear (unsurprisingly).217 However, soon
after Bunkers the Court of  Appeal, in Wood v TUI Travel
Plc,218 gave some sort of indication as to the potential
judicial response. In Wood, there was a claim for
compensation on the grounds that the claimant
suffered food poisoning following eating at a self-
service buffet. An issue arose as to who bore the risk
of food, which in turn led to discussion of the point
at which title in the food passed. Burnett LJ held that
property in food passes when it is served. The
alternative approach, that like Bunkers the property in
the food never passed to the claimant holidaymakers
but remained with the hotel at all times until the object
was destroyed by being eaten, was dismissed as overly
metaphysical.219 This suggests perhaps that Bunkers
may not be of widespread application. Nevertheless,
the necessarily obiter nature of  the discussion in Wood
means that that point was not fully considered. There
may be scope for further consideration here, as to the
nature of ‘consumption’. In Bunkers Lord Mance
referred to the liberty to consume. It is a potentially
arguable point as to whether this specifically means
consumption, in the form of  a destructive using up.
If this narrow interpretation is correct, then it is hard
to really see the difference between Bunkers and Wood,
as both clearly involved the consumption-to-
destruction of a product in the form of a fuel (bunkers
as fuel for the Res Cogitans; buffet food as ‘fuel’ for the
holidaymakers). Yet it is also worth noting that some
commentary is not so strict. Consider for instance Beale
210 Louise Gullifer, ‘“Sales” on Retention of  Title Terms:
Is the English Law Analysis Broken?’ (2017) 133 LQR
244.
211 ibid 256: ‘ left with very little application’. The
relationship between the SGA and ROTC was
considered in Cater pillar (NI) Ltd (formerly FG Wilson
(Engineering) Ltd) v John Holt & Co (Liverpool) Ltd [2013]
EWCA Civ 1232; [2014] 1 WLR 2365. For an excoriating
critique, see Louise Gullifer, ‘The Interpretation of
Retention of Title Clauses: Some Difficulties’ [2014]
LMCLQ 564. For analysis of the potential way forward
for SGA s49 in light of  Bunkers: Djakhongir Saidov,
‘Sales Law Post-Res Cogitans’ [2019] JBL 1, 8-19.
212 Gullifer, ‘“Sales” on Retention of  Title Terms’ (n 210)
256.
213 Saidov (n 211) 1.
214 Kelvin F K Low and Kelry C F Loi, ‘Bunkers in
Wonderland: A Tale of  How the Growth of  Romalpa
Clauses Shrank the English Law of Sales’ [2018] JBL
229, 232 (referencing Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland).
215 Bunkers [2016] AC 1034 [31]. At [34]: being sui generis
‘does not mean that its terms, as regards undertakings as
to description and quality, would not be modelled on
those applying in the sale of goods’.
216 See eg Henry Moore, ‘Case Comment: Unconventional
“Sales”’ (2016) 75 CLJ 465, 467: the lack of guidance is
‘regrettable’; Low and Loi (n 214) 251: ‘it would be
foolhardy to attempt to predict with any confidence
which terms will be implied’.
217 See Saidov (n 211) 7-8.
218 Wood and another v TUI Travel plc (trading as First Choice)
[2017] EWCA Civ 11; [2018] 2 WLR 1051.
219 cf Low and Loi (n 214) 252-253: the ‘much derided
nanosecond … transfer of property theory’ would
resolve the difficulties in this area. Saidov (n 211) takes
a similar view.
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and others, where it is said that ‘such supply contracts
are likely (if on-sale or use of the goods before title
passes is envisaged) to be classified as sui generis supply
and not (conditional) sale contracts’.220 Clearly ‘use’ is
wider than ‘consumption’, even where use and on-
sale are distinguished. This is important, because in
the context of a circular economic plastics industry the
focus (as illustrated by the ICI New Zealand v Agnew
case) is clearly going to be at least as much on a form
of use of plastics as it is on a consumption-to-destruction
of plastics.
Raczynska usefully hints at both the difficulties and
opportunities which Bunkers provides: ‘it would
initially seem that such a supplier could seek to assert
a proprietary interest in the new asset [defined as a
manufactured product or sale proceeds] in the same
way’.221 It is suggested that there are opportunities
following Bunkers for parties to utilise the additional
freedom they appear to be given, to manipulate the
contractual terms in order to more effectively delineate
proprietary rights and obligations. In doing so this
may still allow for a conceptualisation of the sui generis
sale as one which sits within the broad ambit of the
sales doctrine operating under the SGA framework.
Specifically, the argument that Bunkers provides greater
party freedom is commensurate with the basic principle
enunciated in Cochrane v Moor,222 and enthroned in
the Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 17:  parties can
pass property when they intend, as opposed to property
passing on delivery. For Gullifer, this ‘exemplif[ies]
freedom of contract …[and thus a] seller who wants
protection [following delivery] has to bargain for it’.223
If they do so bargain, then sellers can obtain ‘a powerful
method of proprietary protection against counterparty
credit risk by manipulating the passing of property
after delivery’.224 The buyer
gets everything it wants under the
contract except bare title to the goods:
it gets possession and, in the case of
inventory, the right to sell the goods,
often the right to use the goods in
manufacturing or other processes and
sometimes the right to consume the
goods. The seller will usually provide
for the right to repossess the goods on
non-payment, which, crucially, will
survive the buyer’s insolvency because
of  the seller’s proprietary interest in the
goods.225
Unpacking this statement is key to understanding the
implications of  Bunkers. Gullifer suggests that the sorts
of contractual manipulation implied above would be
insufficient to meet desires of sellers and buyers in
financing contexts,  pre and post-insolvency.226
However, analysis of ROTC through an insolvency
lens does not really help in situations where parties do
not go insolvent. In other words, does (and if  so, to
what extent) an ROTC have value outside of post-
insolvency asset distribution questions?227 Certainly
it is the case that an ROTC can be used to impose
‘whatever conditions’ the seller wishes,228 and it has
been examined above how ROTC can provide
220 Beale and others (n 111) [7.02] fn 4.
221 Raczynska (n 107) 15.
222 Cochrane v Moor (1890) 25 QBD 57, 71-73 (Fry LJ).
223 Gullifer, ‘“Sales” on Retention of  Title Terms’ (n 210)
246. Cf  Ji Lian Yap, ‘Predictability, Certainty, and Party
Autonomy in the Sale and Supply of Goods’ (2017) 46
CLWR 269, arguing that Bunkers reduces party autonomy,
as the courts failed to account for the fact that the
parties considered the transaction to be one of sale,
and the wide ranging potential implications reduce the
levels of predictability and certainty for commercial
parties. Though it should be noted that Yap also suggests
(at 280) suggests that if parties wish to stay within the
SGA then they would need to provide for this in the
contract, ‘an example of the parties obtaining a measure
of certainty by means of contractual drafting, which is
in itself an exercise of party autonomy’. This illustrates
the potential contradictions in this area.
224 Gullifer, ‘“Sales” on Retention of  Title Terms’ (n 210)
246.
225 ibid.
226 ibid 250.
227ibid 249-250: the developments by contractual
interpretation have distorted the (insolvency-focused)
‘system of proprietary protection of creditors’, and
instead of ‘an overarching view being taken of the
balance that should be reached between creditors, and
the underlying policies driving this balance, the
development of the law is at the mercy of the ingenuity
of those drafting contracts (who seek to get the best of
all worlds) and the vagaries of which cases come before
the courts and in what circumstances’.
228 Benjamin [5.133] citing Wait v Baker (1848) 2 Exch 1, 7-9;
154 ER 380, 383-384.
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proprietary protection that goes beyond mere
protection against insolvency.229
In the context of  this article’s argument, we can possibly
reformulate the question thusly: what might the impact
of this doctrinal shift be in the context of circular
economic approaches to plastics waste? What is the
extent to which the parties may be able to agree on
terms which affect the extent to which the buyer is able
to use or consume the goods? Recalling Gullifer’s
explanation,230 the buyer ‘often’ has the right to use
and ‘sometimes the right to consume’: the possibility
alluded to is clearly whether a ROTC could provide for
limitations on such rights.
Parties aiming for circular economic practices could
create more appropriate transactional frameworks
utilising ROTC in order to control plastics. Although
it was suggested that parties might be able to utilise
an ROTC to provide for a level of post-sale control,
and that in principle this is possible, it needs to be
recognised that such actions run a considerable risk
that such agreements will actually be (re)characterized
as a charge. Rather than risking the danger of
recharacterization through an imprecise drafting of an
ROTC, parties may wish to focus on an even more
fundamental aspect: the contract as one of sale. More
specifically, achieving the necessary levels of  post-‘sale’
control for effective circular economies requires the
vendor to utilise the power it has in the first place to
construct the nature of the transaction. Bunkers offers
a new route: a Bunkers-style ROTC, that is, one which
demonstrates persuasively that the transaction
concerned is not actually a sale.231 Thus by contractual
agreement, parties can reformulate the transaction as
something other than an SGA sale. The institutional
structure of sale rests on a very solid notion of
property: a sale is defined as a transfer of the property
in goods for a price.232 The centrality of property is
exemplified by Rowland v Divall, where the failure to
pass property was sufficient for there to be a total
failure of consideration: ‘The whole object of a sale is
to transfer property from one person to another’.233
Yet as Gullifer rightly suggests Bunkers demonstrates
the incompatibility of the retention of title ‘structure’
and the 19th century sales jurisprudence encapsulated
in the SGA. The problem beforehand concerned the
insufficient clarity of contractual terms to alter the basic
proprietary operations in terms of combining goods.
The way out of the problem is by redirecting the
strength that does come from party agreement,
towards the nature of the agreement itself, and
agreeing that the transaction is not a sale. This of course
would be a step somewhat further than that taken by
Lord Mance in Bunkers, who merely took the contract
out of the SGA regime. But the logical end point of
this emphasis on the power of the parties to
characterize their transaction is that contracts for the
supply of products that are by their nature consumed
can be framed as licenses. And as Lord Mance put it,
there was a ‘liberty to consume all or any part of the
bunkers supplied without acquiring property in them
or having paid for them’.234 It is thus necessary to
view the transaction as a licence.235
By coming outside of the conceptual structure of a
sale (whether SGA or sui generis), the use of licences
also negates the use of ROTC. This may be beneficial,
in that parties will no longer have to run the risk of
having their transaction (re)characterized as a charge
with the attending registration obligations. In the event
that a transaction is a license to use, then the rights
that a licensee obtains would be limited to the extent
granted by the licensor.236 Thus in Bunkers, the supplier
229 Text following (n 93).
230 Text to (n 225).
231 This is in accordance with Saidov, who suggests that
there needs to be a combination of an ROTC, credit
terms, and a right to consumption for the transaction
to be a sui generis sale; absence of one of those elements
would make it a sale: Saidov (n 211) 7.
232 SGA s 2(1). This arguably goes back to Blackburn’s path-
breaking text on sale, which focused on the proprietary
aspect: Colin Blackburn, A Treatise on the Effect of the
Contract of sale, on the Legal Rights of Property and Possession
in Goods, Wares, and Merchandize (London 1845) xiii. The
classic critique, still valid for the English doctrine, is K
N Llewellyn, ‘Through Title to Contract and a Bit
Beyond’ (1938) 15 NYU Law Q Rev 159.
233 [1923] 2 KB 500, 506-507.
234 Bunkers [2016] AC 1034 [34].
235 See above (n 209).
236 cf Modelboard Ltd v Outer Box Ltd [1992] BCC 945,
above (n 176).
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provided the bunker oil for the purpose of it being
consumed so to propel the ship. This clearly was not a
disposition enabling the user of the oil to do some
other commercial action, such as sub-selling the oil;
indeed such an action was specifically prohibited in the
Bunkers transaction.237
In the instance of plastics waste recycling, if the supplier
were merely to licence the use of plastics for
consumption in a manufacturing process, rather than
selling them, then clearly the buyer/licensee would be
limited in their capacity to dispose of any surplus or
waste. Such surplus or waste would necessarily remain
the property – one could say remains owned by – the
supplier. What then of the plastic that is used by the
buyer/licensee? It cannot be said that they have acquired
any property in the supplied plastics, because the
transactional form prevents such property transferring.
If the ideology underlying the circular economy is
adhered to, then the ideal result even following a
manufacturing process is that the supplier remains
the owner of the produced goods.
What can be seen then is the possibility of using
English personal property law as a mechanism to
enhance the achievement of circular economic practices.
The power to control goods, through the ability to
recapture based on the retention of  ownership, can be
extended by means of conditions within an ROTC,
provided those conditions are sufficiently clear (and
decoupled from the financial aspects of the
transaction). This is however a narrow possibility, and
whilst the courts have remained open to the option in
principle, there may also be scope for suggesting an
alternative, and more radical option: the license
approach suggested by Bunkers. The specific content
of this license would of course turn on the particular
circumstances of the transaction. Essential to this
assessment will be ascertaining, again as with the ROTC
approach, the specific contractual intention of the
different parties. But key to assessing the value of this
approach is distinguishing between how Bunkers
shows the impact of consuming (to destruction) the
goods, and how it also demonstrates that parties can
generate transactions that can go outside the Sale of
Goods Act 1979. Were commercial parties to take up
this option, then there would be room to generate
and demonstrate the sorts of transactional
relationships necessary to enable parties to control
goods down a chain of transactions, according to
principles of  circular economy.
However, a clear note of caution is needed here.
Certainly there is clear value in the increased use of
licences as a means to enable circular economic practices
involving smart technology.238 Licences provide a
quick and easy mechanism to enable the structuring
of the sort of transactions envisaged by circular
economy advocates, where there is no transference of
ownership. Nevertheless, the licence approach is
necessarily limited. It is not easy to see whether it will
be of  special benefit in the context of  plastics recycling.
Its most likely value is merely as part of combined
new approach to commercial transactions, which
would involve the use of multiple different systemic
elements already situated within the doctrinal
framework, just in a different manner to that previously
understood.
4
CONCLUSION
The increasing general prevalence of circular economic
practices, and the growing potential of such practices
as means of dealing with plastics waste, provides
justification for examining how doctrinal mechanisms
could be structured to aid the development of such
practices. However, there remain potential legal
complications regarding how surplus and waste
plastics can be effectively recaptured back into circular
237 Bunkers [2016] AC 1034 [14]: clause H2 of the transaction
said buyer ‘shall not be entitled to use the bunkers
other than for the propulsion of the vessel, nor mix,
blend, sell, encumber, pledge, alienate, or surrender
the bunkers to any third party or other vessel’.
238 Sean Thomas, ‘Law, Smart Technology, and Circular
Economy: All Watched Over By Machines of  Loving
Grace?’ (2018) 10 Law, Innovation & Technology 230.
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economic loops. Such problems have not been
specifically identified in the circular economics literature
concerning plastics (nor indeed in the broader circular
economic literature). The current regulatory framework
on waste rests on the importance of control, and of
the treating of waste as a resource. Both of these aspects
are central to circular economic practices, and moreover,
can be addressed through the doctrinal framework for
ROTC offered by English law.
The English law on ROTC is currently in a rather
confused state regarding the capacity of parties to
generate contractual agreements that enable suppliers
to reach into products. Whilst there is a strong
argument in favour of  the supplier’s interest
disappearing, and a new title generating in favour of
the party undertaking the manufacturing or similar
such process, such an approach is not entirely
unchallengeable. Certainly on policy grounds, it could
be strongly argued that parties in the specific context
of plastics recycling should be allowed to form
transactions which allow for the supplier to maintain
control over any surplus or waste resultant from
processes undertaken over his supplied goods, thus
more easily enabling the development of circular
economic practices. Moreover, it has been
demonstrated that there are reasons to accept that what
the courts have been doing is not prohibiting the
possibility of parties agreeing that the seller will have
control of products; rather they have merely been
noting that such agreements need to be clearly made
and that the cases before the courts have not managed
to do this. Arguably the importance of such control
for circular economic transactions will provide a strong
commercial justification for lawyerly efforts to construct
appropriate transactional forms.
In the event though that working within the ROT
doctrinal framework is not possible, it may be that the
Bunkers decision offers an alternative. Bunkers shows
the possibility of sui generis transactions which may be
more flexible, allowing parties greater freedom in
constructing contracts. It was suggested that the
necessary consequence of this approach of non-SGA
sales, is the increased possibility of the development
of licence-for-use as a viable transactional form. The
removal of property as a central transmittable core of
a ‘sales’ transaction provides the necessary foundations
for circular economic transactions which involve the
initiator retaining ownership in the fullest sense, for
the purposes not of protecting themselves against
their counterparty’s insolvency, but of  providing
themselves with a level of control over the way the
goods are used: minimising surplus and avoiding
waste.
In conclusion, circular economic transactions will need
legal mechanisms that enable ‘sellers’ to control the
use and disposition of goods down a chain of
transactions. One possible way of enabling such control
is to use the ROTC mechanism. This is of course not
the only possibility, but it is one which will fit within
the general tenor of commercial practices and especially
those in circular economic thinking which already rests
heavily on notions of  retaining ownership. It is
arguably possible that the current doctrine can allow
for sellers to own the products of a manufacturing
process, provided appropriate contractual formulations
of sufficient clarity to demonstrate party intent can be
constructed. In addition, it is also possible using the
recent Bunkers case to take such transactions outside
of the classic sales framework. Thus, in the alternative
to an ROTC, it may be appropriate to simply licence
goods. Either way, English personal property law
provides mechanism that can be used to generate
workable circular economic transactions which enable
plastics wastes to be controlled down a chain of
transactions.
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